


# Afghanistan Research Newsletter

Number 27, October/November 2010



**Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit**  
*Research for a Better Afghanistan*

## Meet AREU's New Director, Dr Pierre Fallavier

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### Interview by Peter Wilson, AREU

Dr Pierre Fallavier has recently begun his tenure as Director of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). In Afghanistan, he previously worked as an Urban Planning Advisor with UN-Habitat, designing and helping implement pro-poor urban development projects and policies in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Lashkar Gah. A specialist in community-based poverty reduction, Dr Fallavier has worked with NGOs, UN agencies, and local governments.

Prior to his work in Afghanistan, Dr Fallavier worked on participatory development programmes and social protection in Asia and Southern Africa. He began his career in Thailand and Vietnam, later moving to Cambodia where he monitored and evaluated the impacts of urban poverty reduction policies, supporting participatory slum upgrading projects. He also worked in Zambia and India prior to Afghanistan. Dr Fallavier's academic background includes a Bachelor in Commerce, an MBA, an MA in Community Planning and a PhD in Urban and Regional Planning.

### Why did you decide to come to Afghanistan?

For years I've worked in community development. From colleagues who had worked in Afghanistan, I had heard about the strength and resilience of the Afghan people, and their ability to organise and manage community life despite the disruptive environment, very weak government and chaotic external support. As I find working with communities in challenging situations extremely interesting, I decided to come to Afghanistan. I arrived here in 2008 to work with UN-Habitat. There, I had the chance to combine my experience of project work with strategic planning and with developing national policies based on lessons from the field. With AREU, I hope to continue in that direction by further helping develop the use of local knowledge and input for policy and project decisions.

### What do you consider the highlight of your career prior to your arrival at AREU?

My earlier job in Afghanistan was the most interesting I've had so far. It combined improving the quality of participatory urban development with helping municipalities craft their own development strategies and working with the Ministry of Urban Development to develop national guidelines to consistently support mayors in their efforts. This involved getting urban dwellers organised around the idea that they could improve everyone's living conditions if they were prepared to work together. Even if, in the past, there were enduring conflicts, we found it was better to tackle such disputes indirectly, through encouraging



them to work as communities on projects that would improve everyone's condition.

The results of these initiatives not only enhanced access to services and improved the living conditions of participating communities, but developed their abilities to resolve disputes through the collective-action mechanisms they had developed from working together on local development projects. When this worked with a few leading communities, neighbouring communities saw these transformations and started getting involved. That approach is a building block of large-scale participatory development initiatives such as the National Solidarity Programme, which is essential to peace-building and development.

### Why did you choose AREU?

I liked AREU's mandate of producing quality research for public decision-making, and of developing the abilities of Afghan researchers to do so. International agencies often try to change Afghan institutions based on international best practice. However, these agencies often have only a weak understanding of the Afghan context or of how the institutions they are trying to help change evolved in the first place. AREU's work helps fill this knowledge gap and contributes to local and international decision-makers making better-informed decisions. Personally, it is a privilege to work with a team from whom I learn about Afghanistan's past and present every day.

### What skills or experience do you think you bring to your role at the AREU?

One of my interests is the application of knowledge. Doing quality research is extremely important, but we need to make sure that the results are being used. I think this is where I can bring some experience as I have worked in a few different countries and have a good understanding of how to build capacity to produce sound qualitative research. I also have experience linking research to its use by different types of decision-makers, including local government, civil society organisations, and international aid agencies.

One area I want to focus on is nurturing debate and developing relationships with think-tanks, universities and research centers interested in Afghanistan and our areas of research. One way to do this will be to provide influential academic centres with our work, so that they can use our material for courses and analysis. Another approach is joint research and publication. These initiatives can help inform the development and assistance debate from outside Afghanistan.

Finally, I really like training, which is already a very important contribution of AREU to Afghanistan. In the coming months, we will work at formalising and complementing some of the training our teams already conduct, both to ensure consistency across our teams, and to document our methods, so we can contribute to sharing sound research methods with partners.

**What do you consider to be the AREU's main strength?**

I think there are quite a few, but right now the main strength is its staff, a very interesting mix of people. The majority of our research staff are Afghan, who are working to help improve knowledge and decision-making for their country. They are supported by a small number of highly skilled international researchers. For me, this is a great resource. The Administration and Finance department works to a far higher standard than any NGO I've ever worked with, including some UN agencies. All AREU teams are very professional at what they do. We have some very high quality people and I want to make sure that we help continue to develop their capacities.

We have good examples of people who started work in one position, but moved into other areas. For example, one security guard was very interested in learning, became a research assistant, and was

recently promoted to senior research assistant. We also had a very good cook who became an outstanding accountant, and former drivers who now work in procurement and logistics. There is much space for mobility for people who are interested and committed. I want to continue the approach of my predecessors to make sure we give our staff the tools and training necessary to fulfill their potential so they can do what makes them happy.

**What are your aims as Director? Are there any changes you would like to introduce?**

There are no major changes on the horizon. The previous directors have done a lot of work and I'm very lucky that I'm taking over an organisation that is very well managed. I intend to continue building upon AREU's core strengths of quality, commitment, and usefulness.

I will focus on continuing to strengthen the ability of all of our team. Training more people to perform quality research is very important, and something that we'll have to work on. I will also focus on continuing to improve the way we make results useable and used, both in making sure that we have quality research that is relevant and making sure that it is in formats that different audiences can make use of.

Like other organizations operating in Afghanistan, we have a relatively high turnover rate, especially among international staff, and one thing I want is to make sure their contribution is remembered not only in terms of the research they conducted, but also of the methods they helped develop, which can be of great value for others. We will therefore develop an in-house training curriculum based on the methods that they have been developing, combined with sound theoretical foundations, and will share it across our

The *Afghanistan Research Newsletter* is a quarterly publication of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). The purpose of the Newsletter is to alert readers to new research being undertaken on Afghanistan and to help disseminate research findings and analysis. Some of the resources cited are available on the internet; most books and other publications are available at the AREU library, located in the AREU office (corner of Flower Street and Street 2) and open to researchers Sunday to Thursday, 9am-12pm and 1pm-4pm. The Newsletter is compiled by Royce Wiles. If you have ideas for books or other publications or resources that should be included in the Newsletter, please send an email to [newsletter@areu.org.af](mailto:newsletter@areu.org.af).

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institute based in Kabul. AREU's mission is to inform and influence policy and practice through conducting high-quality, policy-relevant research and actively disseminating the results, and to promote a culture of research and learning. AREU was established in 2002 by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of directors with representation from donors, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organisations. AREU currently receives core funds from the governments of Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Specific projects have been funded by the Foundation of the Open Society Institute Afghanistan (FOSIA), the Asia Foundation (TAF), the European Commission (EC) and the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). All AREU publications are available at [www.areu.org.af](http://www.areu.org.af).

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teams and among our partners from government and civil society. This will cover research methods applied to the specific context of Afghanistan, as well as some of the specific topics we have been or will be studying. This will later help ensure consistent quality in our work while more widely contributing to capacity building with other Afghan organisations.

### **What do you consider to be AREU's role in Afghanistan?**

There are many different components to the role. One is to study and better understand development issues, promoting the idea that you can make better decisions if they are based on facts. Then we have to make the link to what is needed in terms of decision-making. AREU can provide the facts, analysis and training for as many people as possible to adopt this kind of approach.

Little by little, this approach forms the basis for sound policymaking, in terms of what the government does and how civil society and development agencies operate. We can influence decision-making, not by immersing ourselves in the political process, but by making information available to the right people at the right time. This is a core aspect of the AREU's work, helping to inform the democratic process and giving people the opportunity to make better informed decisions.

### **What do you think is the greatest challenge facing Afghanistan at present?**

It's a cliché, but the greatest challenge is for Afghanistan to take care of itself. Right now, a lot of the decisions that are taken on Afghanistan's behalf

are not really informed by facts. Instead, outcomes are determined by political expediency, and financial and personal interests.

We must remember that every single country intervening in Afghanistan is here on a bilateral basis. These political leaders have their own agendas at home, which often have nothing to do with the needs or capacities of Afghanistan. When they don't see any security advantage in staying here, these countries will just withdraw. While they are not going to withdraw completely in the foreseeable future, they are trying to replace some of their military intervention with a civilian one.

For us at AREU, we want to inform decision-making, in terms of creating and sharing knowledge. While we are just one small component of a much larger, complex picture, I believe we're an important part. If nothing else, we are trying to give people the ability to take informed decisions. I think that is extremely important.

### **Are there any final thoughts that you'd like to share with the AREU community?**

We create new knowledge, but our work must aim to influence decision-making, ensuring that decisions are taken on real information and not purely on political grounds. I want people to understand that the studies we do are the start of a dialogue, a dialogue in which we all have a part to play, in Kabul and around Afghanistan.

We need people to make more use of our work, both of what we publish, our resources such as our library, and our staff and their expertise.

## **Supreme Court Library**

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<http://www.supremecourt.gov.af/libraryD1.html> (only the page in Dari is working currently).


The Supreme Court of Afghanistan is located in Kabul near the corner of the airport road and Massoud Circle (on the left when going toward the airport). Officially established in 1967 (1346), the library of the Supreme Court is a small law research library focused on materials about law in general, the interpretation of Islamic law (*fiqh*), civil law, etc. It contains around 6,000 volumes in Farsi, Dari, Pashto, Arabic, Urdu and English; according to the staff, approximately 80% of the materials held are in Arabic.

Currently, the library has no budget and there is no complete listing of the holdings. There are in total six staff in the library, and two of them have received a short course in librarianship (through the library of the Afghan Parliament). Some of the current staff have been working there since before the Taliban

government and they say that there was no looting of the library or other damage during the years of turmoil.

Some donations of law materials have been received since 2001: 1,000 volumes from the Bar Association for Human Rights (UK), 312 volumes from the Iranian Embassy, 86 from the Saudi government, and 44 titles from the former head of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan. The library does have a space problem and does not have room to expand. There is a loan system for staff of the Supreme Court (15 days) but outsiders need to apply for permission to use the materials.

There are two subscriptions to local periodicals (*Sabah* and *Roz*). In addition, the library holds sets of the two Supreme Court publications: *Qaza* (first published in 1930 (1309) and *Mizan* (which began publication under the Karzai government).



Interior of the Supreme Court Library in Kabul (September 2010)

The library has subscriptions to the following local newspapers (backset collections are indicated below where known):

- *Afghanistan*
- *Arman-i-Milli* (1384-1389)
- *Asht-i-Sub* (1387-1389)
- *Bulletin-i-Khas* (Ministry of Information and Culture)
- *Cheragh*
- *Haftah-Namah-i-Kabul*
- *Haftah-Namah-i-Kramat*
- *Hewad* (1384-1389)
- *Irada*
- *Islah* (1384-1389)
- *Mandegar*
- *Milli Anis* (1384-1389)
- *Rah-i-Nejad*
- *Weesa*

### Library supplies in Afghanistan

A new company, Afghanistan Book House (ABH), has set up to supply libraries in Afghanistan. Materials for libraries are sourced locally and internationally, and they can also offer training in technical and specialized aspects of library set-up and running. The contacts are nazari.gholam@gmail.com (+93 799 544 843) and jafari.massuma@gmail.com (+93 798 611 502).

## Research News

### Conference Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid on Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Operations in Afghanistan


“Winning ‘Hearts and Minds’ in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of Development Aid in COIN operations: Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, Thursday 11 - Sunday 14 March 2010.” [Summary prepared by Edwina Thompson]. Steyning, West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wilton Park, 2010. 21 p. <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-report> (PDF 120 KB). This is a very cogent and concise consideration of the place of development aid for security operations and is highly recommended reading. “Development aid is becoming an increasingly important tool to ‘win hearts and minds’ and promote stability in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Given its centrality to current COIN doctrine and strategy, there is still a surprisingly weak evidence base for the effectiveness of aid in promoting stabilisation and security objectives. The main purpose of this conference was to bring together leading academics, policymakers, military personnel and civilian practitioners to explore what evidence does exist. The conference participants were presented with the findings of recent field research conducted by academics on the relationship between aid and security, listened to military and civilian practitioners regarding their experiences implementing stabilisation projects, and heard from policymakers regarding the implications of the evidence for COIN and development policies.” (Summary, p. 1).

Six key points raised (p. 1-3) were:

1. Current stabilisation strategies are based on entrenched and other questionable assumptions
2. The implementation of COIN doctrine has not adequately addressed political issues
3. Effectively designed and delivered development aid does seem to have some stabilisation benefits at a tactical level, but not at a strategic level
4. Less is often more, too much aid can be destabilising
5. Aid seems to be losing rather than winning hearts and minds in Afghanistan
6. Strengthening provincial and district governance systems and fostering effective and transparent Afghan leadership which connects to Kabul is key

### NRVA Analysis

*Poverty Status in Afghanistan: A Profile Based on [the] National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) 2007/08.* Washington, D.C.: World Bank, July 2010. 83 p. The understanding of poverty in Afghanistan has been held back by the lack of representative household data. The poverty estimates released in



this report are the first nationally representative, seasonally smoothed estimates of wellbeing for Afghanistan. According to the executive summary, the newly released NRVA 2007/08 fills the gap in data and indicates that the national poverty rate for Afghanistan is 36 percent, meaning that approximately nine million Afghans are not able to meet their basic consumption and other needs. In addition, there are many more people near that poverty level and a single negative shock can move many more into poverty. This report classifies provinces into five categories, ranging from low-poverty to high-poverty rates (the classification on Page 7 is reproduced from the report: Annex 1, p. 83).

Regional and seasonal differences also affect poverty levels: temperatures vary dramatically across seasons, with hot summers and cold winters, and there are differences of elevation and terrain across regions. Both elements are correlated with poverty outcomes; for example, severe winter conditions affect transportation—roads are often blocked throughout the winter in provinces like Bamyán, Daikuni and Badakhshan—and this means families must rely on stored food during periods of lesser activity (these three provinces have a poverty rate higher than the national average).

Because the NRVA 2007/08 was conducted over an entire year it can show how wellbeing changes during different seasons and how people cope with harsh times. In the summer of 2007 the poverty rate was estimated at 21 percent, much lower than the annual estimate of 36 percent because of the major autumn harvest. Forty percent of Afghan households do not receive any revenue from their principal source of income during winter months and so the poverty rate rose to 32 percent.

Province (alphabetical listing)	Poverty rates (from lowest to highest)
Baghlan Farah Ghazni Helmand Jawzjan Parwan	< 20 %
Faryab Kabul Kandahar Kapisa, Kunduz Nimroz Panjshir Sar-i-Pul	20-30 %
Badghis Herat Nangarhar Takhar Uruzgan Zabul	31-42 %
Bamyan Daykundi Ghor Khost Nooristan Samangan	43-57 %
Badakhshan Balkh Kunar Laghman Logar Paktika Paktya Wardak	> 57 %

The importance of agriculture in Afghanistan's economy remains critical; the NRVA 2007/08 data shows that 36 percent of households rely on farming as their main source of income while another 6 percent depend on farm wages as their main source of income. More than half the households reporting farming as their main source of income are subsistence farmers.

Having paid work is one of the most critical assets for households: 67 percent of individuals in the working age population (aged 16 and over) participate in the labour market. Broadly, 7.9 percent of the labour force

can be considered unemployed. More than 48 percent of employed individuals work an average of less than 35 hours per week, i.e. they are underemployed by this definition.

Child labour mainly affects boys and is higher in rural labour markets. Of nearly eight million Afghan children aged 6-15 years, 18 percent are engaged in some form of economic activity (working either for pay, in family businesses, handicrafts, assisting with agriculture or livestock, or collecting in the street). Male child labour is almost twice that of females, while child labour is three times higher in rural than urban areas.

Patterns of exclusion and vulnerability have a strong gender dimension: women seem to have less access and command over productive resources. First and foremost women in Afghanistan have little access to education: literacy for women aged 15-24 is 22 percent (51 percent for men). Similarly, school enrolment rates for girls aged 6-9 is 31 percent, compared to 43 percent for boys. A key finding is that improvement over time in educational outcomes has been less strong for women than for men. A lack of schooling combined with cultural barriers means that women are ill-equipped to participate in the labour market and have fewer economic opportunities. Labour force participation of women is almost half that of men.

As to whether services are reaching the poor, in general the education and health sectors are an interesting contrast. Overall, primary enrolment is still low (37 percent of children aged 6-9). However, there is no major difference in the enrolment rate for the poorest groups (judged by consumption) and the richest groups. The relationship between school attendance and child labour suggests that the low rates of enrolment are not well-explained by the need to work; 42 percent of children aged 6-15 years are neither engaged in economic activities nor studying.

In terms of health services there are stark differences. Regarding access to prenatal healthcare and skilled care in childbirth, only 24 percent of the poorest mothers receive antenatal care, for the richer groups 43 percent receive this. Only 10 percent of the poorest receive skilled birth attendance, compared to 31 percent for richer groups.

The NRVA shows significant improvement in several education and health indicators over time: (1) enrolment rates for primary school aged children (6-9) have increased nationwide by about 40 percent between 2005 and 2007/08, and (2) the percentage of the young adult population (aged 15-24 years) who are literate increased from 31 to 37.6 percent. Similarly, full immunisation rates of young children (13-24 months) have more than tripled over this period.

The NRVA indicates a surprisingly low rate of disability given Afghanistan's recent history, with 5.2 percent

of Afghans reporting experiencing mild disability (1.3 million people), and 1.6 percent reporting severe disability (400,000 people). However, more than a quarter of households have at least one mildly disabled household member and ten percent of households have at least one severely disabled household member (p. 13).

With high infant mortality and high levels of malnutrition (as evidenced by one of the highest levels of stunting in the world), access to safe drinking water is critical, but less than 20 percent of the population has that; in the countryside this ranges from 18 to 21 percent for both poor and nonpoor groups. In urban areas 39 percent of the poor have access to safe water, with nonpoor groups having a 66 percent access rate.

Tables in the report are disaggregated by region, income sources and gender and other socio-economic characteristics.

### CSO Micro-data Access Policy

*Micro-data Access Policy.* Kabul: Central Statistics Organization [2010]. 12 p. <http://www.cso.gov.af/mdp.html>.

**af/mdp.html. Also released in Dari:** پالسی دسترسی به ارقام خام احصائیوی. On 4 August 2010, the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) launched its Micro-data Access Policy. This will allow users to obtain and use the raw data from selected surveys, and thereby increase the amount of analysis and information available about Afghanistan, which can be used for many purposes including policymaking. The Central Statistics Organization has established these procedures to facilitate the use of raw data for research while maintaining the confidentiality of information supplied by respondents. The policy describes the purpose, the procedure for applying for data, and responsibilities of users.

### Kabul Conference

<http://www.mfa.gov.af/docs-kk.asp> (PDFs, Word documents, etc. 6.1 MB). The agenda, list of participants, communiqué (in three languages), speeches and other documents from the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan (20 July 2010) are currently available from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan website.

## New Publications from AREU

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**September 2010, “The Impact of Microfinance Programmes on Women’s Lives: A Case Study in Parwan,”** by Sogol Zand. This paper is a part of a larger study that explores women’s participation in different development programmes and projects in Afghanistan. This case study looks at women’s participation in a microfinance (MF) programme in the village of Sabz Guzar in Parwan Province and explores its impact on the gender relations both within the family and the community.

**September 2010, “Afghan Election, 2010: Alternative Narratives,”** by Noah Coburn. Released shortly before the 2010 parliamentary election, this brief examined the undiscussed stories surrounding the vote. It argued that while the media focused on fraud and insecurity, there were other significant narratives being missed by the coverage preceding the polls.

**September 2010, “The Wolesi Jirga in Flux, 2010: Elections and Instability I,”** by Anna Larson. This paper critically analyses the effects of elections in the current context of 2010, with a specific focus on the Wolesi Jirga, its members and new candidates. It is part of a series on elections in 2009-10. It draws on extensive research compiling over 200 interviews conducted with MPs, their constituents and new candidates, both at the centre in Kabul and in two case study provinces of Balkh and Paktia. It also exists as a parallel study to another discussion paper in the

series, written on elections and instability with a focus on constituent perspectives at the local level (below).

**September 2010, “Parliamentarians and Local Politics in Afghanistan: Elections and Instability II,”** by Noah Coburn. This paper is primarily an ethnographic description of parliamentary political culture at the local level in three provinces in Afghanistan: Paktia Province and Kabul. It finds the role of the MPs and the competition created by elections varies significantly in each of the districts studied.

**September 2010, “Afghanistan Livelihood Trajectories: Evidence from Faryab,”** by Batul Nezami with Paula Kantor. This report explores dynamics of rural livelihoods in Faryab Province, finding notable deterioration in the livelihood security of the three study villages, each with a dominant ethnic group (Turkmen, Uzbek and Pashtun). Drought and physical insecurity linked to frequent political changes in Faryab, and more recently to insurgent infiltration, are the two drivers for the livelihood decline.

**October 2010, “Capacity-Building Through Policymaking: Developing Afghanistan’s National Education Strategic Plan,”** by Dana Holland. This briefing paper examines the capacity building and policymaking nexus through an examination of the National Education Strategic Plan and its revision. It finds that while clear strides have been made in developing the capacity of the Ministry of Education

to plan for itself, building all the necessary capacities across such a large and dispersed organisation is a daunting and complex task.

**October 2010, “Does Women’s Participation in the National Solidarity Programme Make a Difference in their Lives? A Case Study in Parwan Province,”** by Chona Echavez. This case study is part of a larger study that explores women’s participation in different development programmes and projects in Afghanistan. This case study specifically explores women’s participation in the National Solidarity Program’s Community Development Councils, examining the effects these forms of women’s participation are having on gender roles and relations within the family and the local community.

**October 2010, “Peace at all Costs? Reintegration and Reconciliation in Afghanistan,”** by Tazreena Sajjad. This analyses the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP), which was approved in June

2010 by President Hamid Karzai and is financially backed by the international community, identifies an array of potential flaws, each of which could seriously undermine the APRP’s chances of success. Recognising that the APRP is being implemented in a volatile political and security environment, author Tazreena Sajjad argues that “anticipation surrounding the strategy should be significantly moderated,” and delivers a set of broad recommendations for the Afghan government and international stakeholders.

**October 2010, “Community-Based Dispute Resolution Processes in Balkh Province,”** by Rebecca Gang. This is the Balkh case study from AREU’s community-based dispute resolution research. The goal of the research is increasing knowledge of local dispute-resolution mechanisms, practices and principles to support contextually informed justice sector reform across the country. Case studies on Bamiyan and Nangarhar were released in 2009.

## New Research Publications

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### Agriculture

**“Afghanistan Market Price Bulletin Special Issue (Reporting on Wheat Situation).”** 20 September 2010. [Kabul]: Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), World Food Programme, Afghanistan. 4 p. [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=MDCS-89JHT2&file=Full\\_Report.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=MDCS-89JHT2&file=Full_Report.pdf) (486 KB). Afghans get half their daily calorie intake from wheat products (p. 1). This special issue of the Market Information Bulletin reviews some relevant figures about wheat exports from around the world and the region, in an effort to inform readers and the food security community.

**“Agriculture and Rural Development Cluster: Handout for the Members of the Joint Coordination Monitoring Board, 08 July 2010.”** 2010. [16] p. PowerPoint presentation outlining the rationale, programmes and role of the new Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD) grouping of Afghanistan government ministries (Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), Ministry of Energy and Water (MEW), and Ministry as Counter Narcotics (MCN).

**“Agriculture Prospects Report (26 May 2010).”** Kabul: Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), 2010. 6, 21 p. [http://www.fao.org/ES/esa/en/pubs\\_tfr.htm](http://www.fao.org/ES/esa/en/pubs_tfr.htm). This report has been published in 2005, 2006, 2009, and now 2010 to give a snapshot of the forthcoming Afghan harvest. The main sources of data are 4,000 farmers, provincial

agricultural offices (in 34 provinces) and the technical department of MAIL. Charts and maps show national cereal production, the wheat balance in 2010 (i.e. extent of the wheat surplus by province), changes in wheat area, and some agricultural prices. The appendices track rainfall (21 weather stations), wheat seed production by MAIL, area and production of wheat, livestock condition, etc. As a bonus, pages 12-18 of the annex list the number of households per district (no source acknowledged for this information though).

**Baudienville, Geraldine. “Rural and Agricultural Finance in Afghanistan: final report.”** Kabul: Altai Consulting, 2010. ix, 59 p. (PDF, 1.0 MB). “This study...aims to develop a better understanding of the rural and agricultural finance sector in Afghanistan, highlighting key strengths and weaknesses of the existing offer[ings] as well as opportunities and risks for further development of rural and agricultural financial service provision. While rural finance includes both agricultural finance (financing of agriculture-related activities including input supply, production, post-harvest treatment, distribution, wholesaling, and marketing) and rural microfinance (provision of financing to a heterogeneous rural farm and non-farm population of low income levels), the following analysis puts emphasis on the financing of agriculture-related activities which represent the main source of income in rural areas.” (P. vi).

**“Law on Farm Seeds.”** 2010. 14 p. Translation of the new seed law published in *Official Gazette* 1005 (1388 Qaus 25 = 2009 December 06).

**“Saffron Production in RC [Regional Command] West: RAMT [Research and Analysis Management Team], SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report.”** Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, May 2010. 13 p. “To learn about local means of saffron production 11 Afghan Social Science Research Analysis (SSRA) Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the saffron industry were consulted; each involved in either saffron cultivation as farmers, harvesters or processors in the provinces of Herat and Farah. The SME interviews focused on the following aspects: the conditions surrounding the development of the crop; the instruments in place for increased production and cultivation; access to buyers and markets; and the challenges that hinder increased production.” (P. 4).

## Children

**“Visit of the Special Representative for Children & Armed Conflict to Afghanistan: Mission Report, 20-26 February 2010.”** [Kabul?]: Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, 2010. 15 p. [http://www.un.org/children/conflict/\\_documents/countryvisits/afghanistan.pdf](http://www.un.org/children/conflict/_documents/countryvisits/afghanistan.pdf) (732 KB). “From 20-26 February 2010 the Special Representative undertook a follow-up mission to her previous visit to Afghanistan in July 2008. In close consultation with UNAMA and the UNCT, the Special Representative had the following objectives: (1) First hand assessment of the situation of children in Afghanistan to enhance global advocacy for protection and program interventions for war-affected children. (2) Follow up on her previous visit to Afghanistan in July 2008, with special emphasis on specific commitments...(3) Follow-up on recommendations of the first Secretary-General’s Report on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan (S/2008/695) and on the subsequent conclusions and recommendations of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (S/AC.51/2009/1). (4) Work with UNAMA, the UNCT and other partners to advocate for the strengthening of the monitoring and reporting mechanism in Afghanistan, including greater outreach at field level as well as increased capacity throughout the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) and its partners. (5) Dialogue with NGOs and civil society networks, including women and religious groups, as well as children themselves, to better understand their concerns so as to enhance advocacy on their behalf.” (Introduction, p. 3).

## Civil Society


**How Ulema View Afghan Civil Society: Report from Roundtables with Afghan Religious Scholars.** Arlington [Virginia, USA]: Counterpart International, [2010?]. 18 p. “This report presents the opinions, ideas

and recommendations of the participants [in a series of roundtable discussions with Ulema in 2007] in their own collective voice, and aims to contribute to the ongoing dialogue in Afghanistan regarding the meaning of Afghan civil society and the role all citizens have in its development in a post-conflict era.” (P. 3).

## Climate Change

**“Afghanistan: National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for Global Environmental Management (NCSA) and National Adaptation Programme of Action for Climate Change (NAPA): Final Joint Report.”** Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), February 2009. 123 p. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/afg01.pdf> (7.65 MB). “With funding from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has supported the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to implement the National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for Global Environmental Management (NCSA) and the National Adaptation Programme of Action for Climate Change (NAPA). These aim to identify country level capacity building priorities to address global environmental issues and enhance the capacity of Afghanistan to meet its existing commitments under the UNCCD, UNCCD and UNFCCC; and identify and communicate urgent and immediate adaptation needs of Afghanistan to the effects of climate change. This report presents a comprehensive summary of an intensive two-year process of discussion, workshops, analysis, and capacity building to elaborate a capacity building strategy for compliance with the Rio Conventions and to identify priority activities for adapting to climate change.” (Foreword, p. 5). Also available in Dari:

افغانستان: خود ارزبایی نیازمندی های ظرفیت ملی برای تنظیم محیط زیست جهانی و برنامه عمل ملی سازگاری در برابر تغییر (اقلیمگزارش مشترک نهایی).



## Corruption

Cordesman, Anthony H. "How America Corrupted Afghanistan: Time to Look in the Mirror." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 9 September 2010. 20 p. 30 cm. [http://csis.org/files/publication/100907\\_American\\_Corruption\\_Afghanistan.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/100907_American_Corruption_Afghanistan.pdf) (414 KB). Survey of corruption caused by US fund flows and policies, drawing on earlier published reports and reviews.

## Development

Beath, Andrew [et al.]. *Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase-II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP): Estimates of Interim Program Impact from First Follow-up Survey*. [Kabul?]: [National Solidarity Programme, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development], [2010]. 76 p. [http://www.nsp-ie.org/reports/BCEK-Interim\\_Estimates\\_of\\_Program\\_Impact\\_2010\\_07\\_25.pdf](http://www.nsp-ie.org/reports/BCEK-Interim_Estimates_of_Program_Impact_2010_07_25.pdf) (2.2 MB). "The impact evaluation of the NSP is a multiyear randomized control trial designed to assess the effects of the program across a broad range of economic, political, and social indicators. While a number of qualitative studies of NSP have been conducted to-date, the evaluation is the first large-sample quantitative assessment capable of providing rigorous, statistically unbiased estimates of the economic, institutional, and social impacts of the program. The evaluation is structured into multiple stages in reflection of the multifaceted nature of NSP. The first stage of the evaluation, described in this report, is focused on estimating how the creation of CDCs and the selection of development projects affect political and social outcomes. Data for the first phase is drawn from surveys administered to over 15,000 individuals in 500 sample villages immediately before the introduction of NSP (baseline survey in summer 2007) and again two years later (first follow-up survey in summer-autumn 2009). The evaluation focuses only on villages mobilized by the second phase of NSP, which commenced in 2007." (P. iv).



*Country Programme Document for Afghanistan (2010-2013)*. [Kabul]: [United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), [2009?]. 20 p. [http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/CP\\_AFG\\_2010-2013.pdf](http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/CP_AFG_2010-2013.pdf) (408 KB). An outline (with several pages in log-frame format) of what UNDP will attempt to achieve in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2013.

*The Garden at the End of the World* [videorecording]: *a Documentary on Afghanistan*, by Gary Caganoff. [S.I.]: Lysis, 2010. 1 videodisc (49 minutes). "The Garden at the End of the World is a confronting documentary on Afghanistan illustrating the tragic consequences of war, and the widespread hunger, homelessness and lawlessness that it causes. The film, by...Australian filmmaker Gary Caganoff, portrays the lives of the hardest hit, the widows and orphans, who number in tens of thousands, following two remarkable Australian women; humanitarian, Mahboba Rawi, and internationally recognised permaculturalist Rosemary Morrow, who offer alternatives to the 'reconstruction' efforts that have not worked. Through these two remarkable women Caganoff elicits stories and images of Afghanistan rarely seen before." (Website). A copy of the DVD is held in the AREU library, it can also be purchased online: <http://www.thegardenattheendoftheworld.info/Home.html>.

*Strategic Intent 1389-1393 (2010-2014)*. [Kabul]: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), July 2010. 42 p. <http://www.mrrd.gov.af/English/Data/MRRD-Strategic-Intend-Dari.pdf>. Outline strategy of the strategic focus areas for this ministry: (1) Rural infrastructure and economic development; (2) Local governance; (3) Rural development policy and planning; (4) Institutional and sectoral strengthening; (5) Human capital development. Also published in Dari: مرام یا پلان استراتیژیک ۱۳۹۳-۱۳۸۹

*United Nations Development Assistance Framework: in Support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2010-2013*. [Kabul]: UNAMA, 2010. 36 p. [http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2010-2013CPD/UNDAF\\_AFG\\_2010-2013.pdf](http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/2010-2013CPD/UNDAF_AFG_2010-2013.pdf) (12.1 MB). "The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) charts how the Government and its partners meet the country's development needs. Based on the United Nations system's unique role and breadth of expertise, the UN framework in support of the ANDS focuses on three priority areas: (i) Governance, Peace and Stability, (ii) Sustainable Livelihoods and (iii) Basic Social Services, underpinned by cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender equality, environment, mine action and counter-narcotics. These three priority areas are where the UN is best placed to support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy by focusing on the nexus between stability and poverty alleviation, particularly for the most marginalised and vulnerable." (P. 4).

*USAID Overview: Briefing to ISAF Joint Command, August 17, 2010*. [Kabul]: USAID, 2010. 63 p. PDF (5.5 MB). Overheads from a PowerPoint presentation outlining major areas of USAID work in Afghanistan, including projects related to: civil and

military coordination, agriculture, economic growth, infrastructure, governance, health and education, and stabilization. USAID has around 270 international staff in-country and employs 22,500 Afghans.


## Drugs

**“Afghanistan: (Draft) Strategy Paper 2009-2011.”** [Kabul?]: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, April 2009. 31 p. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Programme\\_Docs/COAFG\\_National\\_Strategy\\_2009-2011.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Programme_Docs/COAFG_National_Strategy_2009-2011.pdf) (2.1 MB). “The strategy outlines UNODC’s vision for the coming two years (April 2009-May 2011).” (Executive summary, p. 2).

## Economy and finance

**“The Afghan National Budget Process: SSRA [Social Science Research and Analysis] Afghanistan, SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report.”** Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, May 2010. 16 p. “This SME Report provides an overview of Afghanistan’s budgeting process, including legislative requirements, procedures, and schedules. The budget is the policy instrument by which the government translates its strategic objectives into programs and services to meet the socio-economic needs of its population. The budget further serves as the basis for internal financial reporting to the Parliament and Afghan citizens. In Afghanistan, the 2004 constitution provides the legal authority for preparing, approving, and executing the national budget. The 2005 Public Finance and Expenditure Management Law (PFEM) further specifies the processes and responsibilities of the various institutions involved in the budget formulation, adoption, and execution. As per Afghanistan’s public law, the Ministry of Finance of the national government is responsible for preparing and executing the budget. The budget is then presented to both houses of Parliament for approval. The budget plan has to be presented at least 45 days before the beginning of the fiscal year and approved no later than 30 days after the start of the fiscal year. Throughout the year, the Treasury implements the budget. After the end of the fiscal year, an ex-post audit is conducted to confirm that the budget was properly executed.” (P. 4).

**Afghanistan Economic Update.** Washington, D.C.: Policy and Poverty Team, South Asia Region, The World Bank, April 2010. 13 p. <http://siteresources>.




[worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1264608805475/Afghanistan\\_Spring\\_Brief\\_April.pdf](http://www.worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1264608805475/Afghanistan_Spring_Brief_April.pdf) (384 KB). This paper reviews (1) recent political and security developments (including outcomes from the London Conference), (2) recent economic developments, (3) structural and institutional reforms, and (4) 2010/2011 outlook.

**“Credit and Loans in Afghanistan: Afghanistan RAMT [Research and Analysis Management Team], SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report.”** Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, April 2010. 9 p. “A deficit of awareness currently exists with regard to the nature and dynamics of micro-level credit and loan systems operating in the country. It is therefore the purpose of this report to address this knowledge gap. As such, SSRA has tasked an Afghan Subject Matter Expert (SME) to investigate how people obtain loans and credit in Afghanistan.” (p. 4). There is no recognition in this paper of any of the previous studies on credit or microcredit in Afghanistan.

**Donor Financial Review: Report 1388.** Kabul: Ministry of Finance, 2009. 47 p. <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/Donor%27sFinancialReview%20ReportNov2009.pdf>.

This is the second summary review examining official development assistance to Afghanistan (1380-1388), aid delivery channels and modalities, official development assistance 1387-1388, as well as perspectives on donor assistance in Afghanistan. Any comments about the Afghan economy will need to take this information into account.




## Elections

Achakzai, Abdul Halim. **“Afghan Parliamentary Elections.”** Kabul, Afghanistan: Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies, Afghanistan, 2010. 5 p. <http://www.caps.af/Doc/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Afghan%20parliamentary%20Elections%20.pdf> (3.86 MB). A brief and rather general presentation about the elections, the electoral process and short statements of potential problems.

Ali Amiri and Abdul Jalil Benish. **“The First Experience: Voting Patterns and Political Alignments in Wolesi Jirga (2005-2010).”** Kabul: AfghanistanWatch, September 2010. 36 p. [http://www.watchafghanistan.org/files/The\\_First\\_Experience%5BVoting\\_Patterns\\_and\\_Political\\_Alignments\\_in\\_Wolesi\\_Jirga\(2005-2010\)%5D\\_](http://www.watchafghanistan.org/files/The_First_Experience%5BVoting_Patterns_and_Political_Alignments_in_Wolesi_Jirga(2005-2010)%5D_)

### ***Afghanistan Investors' Directory 2010***

Kabul: Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), 2010. 630 p. This directory lists over 7,500 businesses in Afghanistan, arranged by sector: (1) Agriculture, (2) Construction, (3) Industry, and (4) Services. All entries are in English only. Phone numbers, street address, and email details are provided. The directory is available from the Research and Policy Department of AISA (invest@aisa.org.af, +93 (0)799 336 609) for US\$20 or Afs1,040. The information is also available on-line: <http://www.directory.aisa.org.af/>



**English.pdf (436 KB).** “This study analyzes the first post-Taliban Wolesi Jirga which is at its final days of legislative period, and attempts to identify lessons from the first post-Taliban national assembly that can be applied to the next period. Undoubtedly, it does not contain the whole picture of the Wolesi Jirga, but is a step forward in presenting insights on the Wolesi Jirga and explaining its performance with a particular focus on the ‘voting patterns and political alignments’ in the parliament.” (P. 2). Also released in Dari.

**Bijlert, Martine van.** “Who Controls the Vote: Afghanistan’s Evolving Elections.” [Berlin]: Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), 2010. 30 p. [http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/AAN-2010-Controlling\\_the\\_vote-final.pdf](http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/uploads/AAN-2010-Controlling_the_vote-final.pdf) (540 KB). “Although many internationals believe the upcoming parliamentary vote will be less controversial than last year’s election, all indications are that it will be messy, fiercely contested and manipulated at all levels. An analysis of the under-reported 2009 provincial council results provides important clues on what this will look like. The analysis, first of all, indicates that candidate networks in the insecure areas will probably revert to the same bulk vote tactics that they used in the presidential and provincial council elections. The mass availability of additional voter cards and the risk of disqualification will prompt candidates to seek to secure an exaggerated number of votes. Although many have learnt from the 2009 controversies and will try to make the fraud less detectable, in areas where the contest is fierce and conditions are favourable, the fraud is likely to again be blatant, unsophisticated and widespread. Second, the analysis demonstrates that in 2009 large-scale, mostly undetected, manipulation took place within the electoral administration and at a relatively late stage - aiming either to neutralise large disqualifications or to bolster the vote of candidates who fell slightly short. It seems unlikely that the 2010 elections will see a mass release of polling centres on the same scale as in 2009, but candidates from all provinces will certainly seek to again manipulate the final processes - with help from within the electoral

administration. The provincial case studies starkly illustrate that, once fraud has occurred, it is difficult to reconstruct what the real vote would have been. But it has also proven very difficult to prevent fraud, as mitigating measures are widely disregarded and the electoral authorities are faced with a massive loss of control.” (P. 1).

**Decree by the President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Ratification of Electoral Law: no. 43, date 28/11/1388 [=17 February 2010].** 2010. 26 p. [http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/electorallaw\\_eng.pdf](http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/electorallaw_eng.pdf) (384 KB). Original law published in *Official Gazette* no. 1012 (10 Hoot 1388 = 1 March 2010). This is an unofficial translation (by UNAMA and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems [IFES]) which represents the law as issued by Decree 45 dated 4/11/1388 (67 articles). This English version was issued on August 16, 2010. As well as repealing earlier election laws, the Municipal Election Law (*Official Gazette* no. 814 [30/10/1382 = 21 December 2003]) has also been repealed. There is also a second translation: **Democracy International: “2010 Electoral Law of Afghanistan: Issued under Article 79 of the Constitution of Afghanistan.”** 30 p. [http://www.democracyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Electoral\\_Law\\_of\\_Afghanistan\\_DI\\_Unofficial\\_Translation.pdf](http://www.democracyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Electoral_Law_of_Afghanistan_DI_Unofficial_Translation.pdf) (264 KB).

**Decree of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Non-interference in the Electoral Affairs of Elections 1388 (2009): Date 30/2/1388 (20 May 1388).** 2009. 2 p. [http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/presidential\\_decree\\_non-interference\\_in\\_election\\_process.pdf](http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/law/presidential_decree_non-interference_in_election_process.pdf) (38 KB). This decree makes explicit that government employees and UN agencies must not in any way interfere with the electoral process.

**“Election Day 2010: First Preliminary Observation Report, September 20, 2010.”** Kabul: Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA), 2010. 6 p. <http://fefafoundation.org/index.php?view=article&catid=3&areport&id=110&aelection-day-2010-first-preliminary-observation-report-september->

**20-2010&format=pdf&option=com\_content (PDF 320 KB).** FEFA's first report about voting irregularities during the election.

**[FactSheets Released by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) for 2010 Wolesi Jirga elections].** Kabul: Independent Election Commission (IEC), 2010. 1 vol. (various pagings). <http://www.iec.org.af/eng/content.php?id=4&cnid=46> (PDFs: 2009 3.2 MB, 2010 5.8 MB). Contents: Anti-fraud measures (28 August 2010) (7 p.)—Ballot Lottery for 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections (21 August 2010) (1 p.)—Ballots (14 August 2010) (2 p.)—Electoral Campaign Period (21 June 2010) (2 p.)—Candidate Nomination (14 August 2010) (2 p.)—Candidate Nomination: Verification of Supporters Lists (14 August 2010) (1 p.)—Demystifying Results [Timeline for Release of Results] (14 August 2010) (1 p.)—District Field Coordinators (14 August 2010) (1 p.)—Candidate Nomination: Female Candidates (17 May 2010) (2 p.)—Gender at the IEC (14 August 2010) (2 p.)—Intake, Storage, and Delivery of Materials to National Tally Centre (14 August 2010) (2 p.)—International Support to the 2010 Elections (9 August 2010) (3 p.)—Preparations (21 August 2010) (2 p.)—Security of Voters (14 August 2010) (2 p.)—National Tally Centre (24 August 2010) (2 p.)—Training of Polling Staff (14 August 2010) (2 p.)—Vetting (14 August 2010) (2 p.).


**“Final List of Candidates, Wolesi Jirga Election 2010.”** Kabul: Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), 2010. 1 v. (various pagings, printed from website). <http://www.iec.org.af/eng/content.php?id=4&cnid=45> (PDFs, total 27 MB). Translations of the list of candidates for each province arranged according to ballot paper order, with the number of each candidate, full name, thumbnail portrait, candidate election symbol, party affiliation (if any) and ballot sequence number.

**“2010 Wolesi Jirga Candidate List.”** [Kabul]: Democracy International, 2010. <http://www.afghan2010.com/resource/2010-wolesi-jirga-candidate-list> (HTML files 600 KB, Excel file 105 KB). A tabulation (“analysis”) of the HTML files above giving an overview of political party affiliations, with a separate Excel file for each province showing the number of independent candidates, those affiliated with parties, breakdown by gender, and seat allocation by gender.

Sudhakar, Nina and Scott Worden. **“Real Change for Afghan Women’s Rights: Opportunities and Challenges in the Upcoming Parliamentary Elections.”** Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 11 August, 2010. 5 p. <http://www.usip.org/resources/real-change-afghan-womens-rights-opportunities-and-challenges-in-the-upcoming-parliamentar> PDF (296 KB). “This Peace Brief highlights key issues that must be

resolved to ensure Afghan women’s continued political participation in the upcoming parliamentary elections on September 18, 2010 and beyond.” (P. 4).

**The 2009 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan.** Washington, D.C.: National Democratic Institute, 2010. 102 p. [http://www.ndi.org/files/Elections\\_in\\_Afghanistan\\_2009.pdf](http://www.ndi.org/files/Elections_in_Afghanistan_2009.pdf) (1.5 MB). This is one of the most comprehensive and useful reviews released of the entire 2009 election process. The paper examines NDI’s own observation mission, electoral history and legal framework as well as the pre-election preparations, campaigns, and women’s participation. The election itself is described in detail as is the post-election period and the runoff. A number of maps and discussions present analysis of other elements in the election outcomes (voting patterns, polling booth details, etc.).



## Health

**Salamati: the Health Magazine for Community Health Workers,** published by Aide Médicale Internationale. This regular magazine provides illustrated basic health care information for the Afghan community (separate editions in English and Dari/Pashto). The current issue (no. 42, third quarter 2010) focuses on communicable diseases. For copies contact [kabul.salamati@amifrance.org](mailto:kabul.salamati@amifrance.org) or 0799 900 787.

## Language Learning

Naderi, Shamim. **“An Analysis of Native Dari Speakers’ Errors in University-level Dari and English Writing.”** 2010. 67 p. <http://krex.k-state.edu/dspace/bitstream/2097/2930/1/ShamimNaderi2010.pdf> (914 KB). Thesis (MA), Kansas State University, 2010. “The purpose of the present study is to identify spelling and word choice errors in the writing samples produced by Afghan native Dari speakers and to discover the interrelationship between errors in Language 1 and Language 2 in order to add to the pre-existing EFL research literature and offer some suggestions for better English teaching practices in Afghanistan.” (P. 2).


## Private Military and Security Companies

**Decree Translation: President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan about Dissolution of Private Security Companies, #65, 17.08.2010.** 2010. [1] p. [http://president.gov.af/Contents/102/Documents/2122/Presidential\\_Decree\\_on\\_The\\_Disbandment\\_of\\_Private\\_Security\\_Firms.pdf](http://president.gov.af/Contents/102/Documents/2122/Presidential_Decree_on_The_Disbandment_of_Private_Security_Firms.pdf).

Shameem, Shaista. "Report of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-determination: Addendum, Mission to Afghanistan." New York: United Nations, 14 June 2010. 20 p. <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/A.HRC.15.25.Add.6.pdf> (141 KB). "At the invitation of the Government of Afghanistan, the Working Group on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the rights of peoples to self-determination visited the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from 4 to 9 April 2009. The Working Group welcomed this opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Government and other stakeholders on issues related to its mandate." (P.1). "On the basis of its findings, the Working Group makes several recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan, including that it should investigate, disarm and prosecute all PMSCs [Private Military and Security Companies] operating without licences in the country and investigate all reported cases of incidents involving casualties committed by private security contractors, prosecute the perpetrators and ensure effective remedy for victims." (P. 2).

## Islam

Mumtaz Ahmad, Dietrich Reetz, and Thomas H. Johnson. *Who Speaks for Islam?: Muslim Grassroots Leaders and Popular Preachers in South Asia*. Seattle, Wash: National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2010. 1 electronic text (iii, 65 p.). Contents: 1. Media-Based Preachers and the Creation of New Muslim Publics in Pakistan / Mumtaz Ahmad. — 2. Muslim Grassroots Leaders in India: National Issues and Local Leadership / Dietrich Reetz. — 3. Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad in Southern Afghanistan / Thomas H. Johnson. "Globalization processes, through increasing transnational networks and the growth



of new forms of media, are changing the dynamics of Muslim religious authority in South Asia. In this NBR Special Report, Mumtaz Ahmad, Dietrich Reetz, and Thomas H. Johnson examine the evolving social and political roles of Muslim religious figures and leaders in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. This study finds that the role of religious leadership at the local level has not been diminished by increasing globalization, but nontraditional voices of religious authority are emerging and traditional leaders are using new media tools to reach wider audiences." (Publisher website).

## Languages

*The Iranian Languages*. Edited by Gernot Windfuhr. London: Routledge, 2009. lxxvi, 872 p. ISBN 9780700711314 (hb: alk. paper). "The Iranian languages form the major eastern branch of the Indo-European group of languages, itself part of the larger Indo-Iranian family. Estimated to have between 150 and 200 million native speakers, the Iranian languages constitute one of the world's major language families. This comprehensive volume offers a detailed overview of the principal languages which make up this group." (Backcover).

## Land

"Afghanistan Government Land Policy: Afghanistan RAMT [Research and Analysis Management Team], SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report." Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, April 2010. 9 p. "This report seeks to investigate the procedures for the government to sell land in Afghanistan, what level of the government administration can sell land, who has the authority to do so, the rights pertaining to government land sales, and whether or not government land is being sold around the country." (P. iv).

Wily, Liz Alden. *Community Based Pasture Management (CBPM) in Afghanistan: Guidelines for Facilitators: Helping Communities to Bring Pastures under Conservation Management*. [Kabul?]: [Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods in Eastern Hazarajat (SALEH)], 2008. 47 p. (PDF 632 KB). "This document provides step by step guidance for bringing pastures under localised conservation management, and in the process resolve conflicts over rights to a particular pasture. The Guidelines are targeted to facilitators; that is, officials or other actors leading the process in the field. The Guidelines have been prepared by FAO's SALEH programme operating in the central highlands (Sustainable Agricultural and Livelihoods in the Eastern Hazarajat). They arise out of SALEH's experience in assisting communities in three districts to bring local pastures under working community based management. A first draft was

prepared in 2006, another in 2007 and a further draft in 2008, each one building upon more practical experience as it was gained. This draft is presented as the final version. These are now made available by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoAIL) for widespread testing throughout Afghanistan. They may be referred to as Version #1.” (Cover).

**Wily, Liz Alden. “Recommended Strategy for Conflict Resolution of Competing High Pasture Claims of Settled and Nomadic Communities in Afghanistan. Kabul: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), October 2009. 99 p. [http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/afg\\_tech/theme\\_01/afg\\_rangeland\\_EN.pdf](http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/afg_tech/theme_01/afg_rangeland_EN.pdf) (2.0 MB).** This document lays out a possible road map for resolving the conflict between Pashtun nomads (Kuchi) and Hazara about access to pastureland in the central highlands. The central highlands include the foothills in western Maidan Wardak and western Ghazni Provinces, as well as the higher pastures of Bamiyan Province, eastern Ghor Province and Day Kundi Provinces. This strategy has been largely developed for the benefit of two sets of actors who have major decision-making roles when it comes to determining how the conflict between Kuchi and Hazara will be settled. These are the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) and the Presidential Commission for Resolving the Hazara Kuchi Pasture Conflict.

## Law, Justice, Peace and Reconciliation

**“Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP).” Kabul, Afghanistan: D&R Commission, National Security Council, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2010. 37 p. PDF (512 KB).** This document outlines the program of the Afghan government to achieve peace with and reintegration of anti-government and other elements. “The APRP has been developed on the basis of the recommendations of the 1,600 broadly representative Afghan delegates to the Consultative Peace Jirga (CPJ) of June 2010. The APRP is a proposal by the National Security Council on behalf of the executing ministries of the Joint Secretariat for Peace and Reintegration.” (Paragraph 1). “The Government will promote a strategy with three pillars. The first is the strengthening of our security and civilian institutions of governance to promote peace and reintegration. The second is the facilitation of the political conditions and support to the Afghan people to establish an enduring and just peace. The third is enhancement of national, regional and international support and consensus to foster peace and stability” (Paragraph 6). Title also in Dari: پروگرام ملی صاحب آشتی ملی و جذب مجدد: مسوده تفصیلی پروگرام

**Coburn, Noah and John Dempsey. “Informal Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan.” Washington, D.C.: United**

**States Institute of Peace (USIP), August 2010. 19 p. <http://www.usip.org/resources/informal-dispute-resolution-in-afghanistan> (PDF 268 KB).** “This report discusses informal justice in Afghanistan and its relationship to state institutions. It draws on a series of pilot projects sponsored and overseen by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and on work by other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international donors, and the international military in Afghanistan, as well as on field visits by the authors. Over the past several years, the USIP team that oversaw the projects spoke with hundreds of Afghan government officials, community leaders, citizens, members of the NGO community, international government officials, and military personnel about informal justice issues. The report provides a summary of this research and a series of recommendations for the Afghan government and the international community engaged with rule of law in the country.” (P. 1).

**Gang, Rebecca. “Seeing Like a Law Reformer: a Case Study of the Afghan Independent Bar Association.” 2010. Long paper (Master of Law) Harvard Law School, Graduate Program, 2010. 108 p.** “To evaluate the successes and failures of the AIBA [Afghan Independent Bar Association] as it consolidates its role as a key institution in the development and protection of the legal profession in Afghanistan, it is critical to understand its establishment as the insertion of a new institution into an existing social and political milieu where both national and international stakeholders hold a range of interests; appreciate how the demands of the national and international contexts have impacted on programmatic objectives of the AIBA project; and recognize the creation of a central bar association as one choice among many. By foregrounding these kinds of considerations, I attempt to show that the establishment of a new justice sector institution, no matter how clear its mandate, how developed its rule systems or participatory its design phase, will not inherently resolve the problems for which it was created—and may in fact lead to new challenges.” (P. 6-7). Author contact: rebeccagang@gmail.com

**National Assembly Resolution Regarding Reconciliation and General Amnesty. Kabul: Hout 1389/10 March 2007. 2007. 2 p.** This is the unpublished translation of a law published as the “Law on National Reconciliation, Public Amnesty and National Stability” in *Official Gazette* no. 965 (3 December 2008 = 31 Qaus 1387). An earlier version seems to have been translated as: “National Assembly’s Resolution Regarding National Reconciliation and Amnesty, Draft translation,” by Wahdat Wassel (1385), <http://www.afghanmania.com/en/news/0,news,4965,00.html>.

**“Nomadic and Settled Communities, a Community Based Peacebuilding Approach.” Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), 2010. <http://www>.**

[cpau.org.af/Peace\\_building/NomadicSetCom\\_AComPBapp.html](http://cpau.org.af/Peace_building/NomadicSetCom_AComPBapp.html) (PDF files, total 4.9 MB). "Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), with the support of National Endowment of Democracy, has been working towards promoting a peaceful community based approach to the conflict between the settled and nomadic groups in different districts of Wardak province. The conflict between the nomadic and settled groups has many different aspects and a long history of conflict and violence. These two groups have been used as political pawns in a bigger political game ever since the time of the 'Iron Amir' Abdur Rahman Khan. In an attempt to further CPAU's commitment to community empowerment in Afghanistan, we have gathered personal testimonies from people in both communities in order to enlighten their local realities, by their own account." (Website, accessed 8 September 2010). The fifteen testimonies from each group are presented in English, Dari and Pushto (with some audio files also available).

*Taliban & Resolution of Disputes: Afghanistan RAMT [Research and Analysis Management Team], SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report.* Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, April 2010. 14 p. "The purpose of this report is to understand how and to what extent people across Afghanistan ask for help with problems by referring them to a Taliban shadow government operating in the area." (P. 5). With the many failings of the government justice system (bribes, delays, lack of transparency, etc.), Taliban authorities are providing an effective alternative source of arbitration.

## Politics and Government

*Code of Conduct for the Mujahiden of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.* 2nd. ed. 20 May 2010. 11 p. English translation of the revised Layeha or handbook for Taliban mujahidin.

Esmaty, Nasrat and Asadullah Ahamdi. *A Broken Relationship: a Study of the Provincial Councils and their Ability to Serve the Afghan People.* Kabul: Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC), July 2010. 52 p. "Research carried out in 2008 and 2009 by HRRAC confirmed that ordinary people's voices in Afghanistan are silenced by local powerbrokers, especially in rural areas, and that ties between citizens and their elected representatives at all levels remain weak. In particular, a 2009 HRRAC survey of informal workers revealed widespread feelings of disappointment with how Members of Provincial Councils (MPCs) interacted with and served their constituents. Disenchantment depresses the political participation on which Afghanistan's nascent democracy must ultimately stand. Following the election of new Provincial Councils (PCs) under less than

ideal conditions at the end of 2009, the development of more and better linkages between constitutions and MPCs is urgently required." (Executive summary, p. 1). (The PDF should appear soon on <http://www.afghanadvocacy.org.af/>).

Foust, Joshua. "Post-Soviet Central Asian National Interests in Afghanistan." New York: Century Foundation, 2010. 38 p. <http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/foust.pdf> (628 KB). "[T]he five post-Soviet states to Afghanistan's north—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan...will have a hand in determining Afghanistan's future. Yet, there is little understanding of exactly what their role might be. All five post-Soviet Central Asian states have stakes in the outcome of the war in Afghanistan. However, those stakes are not necessarily of primary interest to their governments. With the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan (whose recent revolution may have altered its interests), the primary goal of these states is regime survival. Therefore, it is possible to examine what they consider to be at stake through the lens of their own domestic concerns." (P. 3).

Giustozzi, Antonio. "Afghanistan." In *Guide to Islamist Movements: Volume 1*, edited by Barry Rubin (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), p. 181-195. This important summary examines Islamism in Afghanistan from its emergence in the 1960s to the present day, tracing the backgrounds of a number of important movements: Hezb-i-Islami, Jami'at, the Shura-i-Nezar, Dawat-i-Islami, Hezb-i-Wahdat, the Taliban and others. In addition, Giustozzi examines the influence of Islamism within Afghan society, identifying the strong influence of Islamists in the countryside: in the parliament elected in 2005 "up to 116 MPs out of 249 were linked to Islamist groups" (p. 190). "The role of Pakistan in supporting Islamist groups in Afghanistan is at the same time obvious and difficult to define. There is no question that support is delivered through Pakistani territory and that current or former Pakistani officials are assisting the Taliban with advice and training. What is not certain is whether the Pakistanis provide direct funding and supplies or simply channel whatever is sent by other sources." (P. 192). "[I]n the event of an American withdrawal, given that military power is largely concentrated in Islamist hands either directly or indirectly through their infiltration of the security agencies, Islamist groups would rapidly make a claim for state control. Since the divisions among the Islamists are as deep as ever, a new civil war would be the likely result." (P. 193).

"Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?" Edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Aroop Mukharji. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2010. 128 p. [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/regional\\_approach](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/regional_approach).

pdf (1.8 MB). Essays surveying regional countries' real and perceived interests in Afghanistan, the policies they have adopted or promoted, the impact of those policies and the interrelationships of various regional countries. Additional essays on the Afghan perspective in a regional approach and on the viewpoint of key troop contributing Coalition nations. Chapter headings are: "Through Their Eyes: Possibilities for a Regional Approach to Afghanistan," Jessica T. Mathews—"Afghanistan," Haroun Mir—"Pakistan," Frédéric Grare—"India," Gautam Mukhopadhyaya—"Iran," Karim Sadjadpour—"Saudi Arabia," Christopher Boucek—"Central Asian Republics," Martha Brill Olcott—"China," Michael D. Swain with Tiffany P. Ng—"Russia," Dmitri Trenin—"Key Coalition Partners," Gilles Dorronsoro—"Conclusion: Implementing a Regional Approach to Afghanistan: Multiple Alternatives, Modest Possibilities," Ashley J. Tellis.

Katzman, Kenneth. "Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance." Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 29 June 2010, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21922.pdf> (502 KB). A very useful (periodic) overview of recent political, electoral and governmental issues and events.

Khalilzad, Zalmay. "Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq." *Journal of Democracy* v. 21 (no. 3) (July 2010): 41-49. <http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Khalilzad-21-3.pdf> (488 KB). Opinion piece from special presidential envoy (2002-2005), U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (2003-2005) and U.S. ambassador to Iraq (2005-2007).

Miakhel, Shahm Mahmood and Noah Coburn. "Many Shuras do not a Government Make: International Community Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan." Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 7 September 2010. 6 p. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pb50.pdf> (336 KB). "Without the international community's and the Afghan government's implementation of a coherent vision for local governance in Afghanistan, local politics will likely remain volatile, with some councils even serving as destabilizing forces. However, such a coherent vision can be developed by acquiring local knowledge, forging strong relationships between informal leaders and government officials, and by focusing on a much smaller number of local shuras that are seen as legitimate and truly representative in their respective areas." (P. 1).

O'Hanlon, Michael E. and Hassina Sherjan. *Toughing it Out in Afghanistan*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, c2010. xiii, 164 p. ISBN 9780815704096 (pbk.: alk. paper). "In this unique collaboration between an American scholar and an Afghan American entrepreneur, 'Toughing it Out in

Afghanistan' provides a succinct look at the current situation in Afghanistan with policy prescriptions for the future." (Backcover).

Rashid, Ahmed. *Taliban: the Power of Militant Islam in Afghanistan and Beyond*. 2nd ed. London: I.B. Tauris, c2010. xvii, 319 p. ISBN 9780300163681 (pbk.). The first edition of this classic account has sold more than 1.5 million copies in English, with translations into more than 26 other languages. Banned in Central Asia and in Saudi Arabia. A new final chapter ("The Taliban Resurgent 2000-2009") brings the account of the Taliban up-to-date and fills a significant gap in competent narrative accounts of the past ten years of Afghanistan's political and military history."


"Sub-national Governance Policy: Executive Summary (Summer 2009)." Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. 2009. [50] p. This is the evolving policy document at the heart of the work of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). Some draft laws relevant to its implementation are also available (all in draft form only): [01] Local Governance Law (20 p.)—[02] Law on Provincial Councils (11 p.)—[03] Law on Municipal Councils (13 p.)—[04] Law on District Councils (10 p.)—[05] Law on Village Councils ([8] p.). Another version dated "Spring 2010" (again with no page numeration) is also held in the AREU Library (PDF 344 KB).

Thruelsen, Peter Dahl. "The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: a Localized Insurgency with a Local Objective." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* v.21 (no. 2) (June 2010) p. 259-276. "This article gives an in-depth description and analysis of the Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan in 2008. It describes the local dynamics of the insurgency and argues that the Taliban should not be seen as a unified hierarchical actor that can be dealt with as part of a generic approach covering the whole of Afghanistan. The article shows that the insurgency in southern Afghanistan is highly localised in nature, being to a large extent driven by local commanders and local area networks often centred on individual commanders themselves. It also shows that the driver or cause behind the insurgency differs for the local Afghan Taliban and the foreign Pakistani Taliban respectively. The nature of the southern insurgency, with the local Taliban commanders working through local knowledge networks with a locally determined cause, implies that a strategic-level 'peace deal' with Tier I of the strategic Taliban leadership will not create the desired effect of ending the insurgency - there will not be an overall domino effect in these parts of the country." (Abstract).

## Prisons and Prisoners

“Basic Training Manual of Prison and Detention Center Workers on the Practical Application of [the] Constitution of Afghanistan, Law of Prisons and Detention Centers, and Prison and Detention Center’s Regulations for Management of Affairs: Instructor’s Version: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” [Kabul?]: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2009. 141 p. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Prison\\_Reform/Basic\\_Training\\_Manual\\_for\\_Prison\\_and\\_Detention\\_Centre\\_Workers.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Prison_Reform/Basic_Training_Manual_for_Prison_and_Detention_Centre_Workers.pdf) (890 KB). A comprehensive and foundational training manual prepared to provide a set of guidelines to reconcile two aspects of Afghanistan’s prison systems: the safeguarding of prisoners’ rights and the recognition of the role of prison officers. (P. 6).

“Drug Use Survey 2010: Sarpoza Prison, Kandahar, Afghanistan: Assessment of Drug Use Levels and Associated High-risk Behaviours amongst the Prison Population of Sarpoza Prison, Kandahar”. [Kabul?]: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), June 2010. 16 p. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Prison\\_Reform/SPDUS\\_Full\\_Report\\_130710\\_new\\_cover.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Prison_Reform/SPDUS_Full_Report_130710_new_cover.pdf) (4.18 MB). “This evaluation aims to assess the levels of drug use and associated high-risk behaviours in the prison population of Sarpoza Prison, Kandahar, in order to inform the subsequent planning and provision of prison-based and community-based (prison aftercare) treatment and harm reduction service delivery.” (P. 2). The prison currently houses around 1,000 prisoners (12 of them female).



“The Religious Rights and Duties of Muslim Inmates in Prisons: a Guide for Criminal Justice Personnel: the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. [Kabul?]: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2009. 8 p. [http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Prison\\_Reform/ReligiousRightsMuslimInmates.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Prison_Reform/ReligiousRightsMuslimInmates.pdf) (167 KB). “During a series of seminars and training sessions conducted by the International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations (ISPAC), it was found that administrative and security personnel in many prisons throughout the world do not understand the religious rights and duties of the Muslim inmates they hold...Thus the following was prepared from information provided by the Arab Security Studies and Training Center (ASSTC), an Arab

Regional Center in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The ASSTC carefully reviewed and approved all the material pertaining to Religious Rights and Duties. The material was further refined by adding suggestions to help justice personnel find ways to permit observant Muslim inmates to practice as many of their religious duties as good prison practice allows.” (P. 4). The manual has also been approved by Afghan religious and legal authorities.

## Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

*Internally Displaced Persons: a Tactical Liability in Kandahar?: District Look.* [S.I.]: Strategic Multi-layer Assessment Pakistan/Afghanistan Rich Contextual Understanding Project (SMA PAKAF RCU), 25 June 2010. 10 p. This paper “is a *District Look* to identify and discuss a key liability in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIROA) situation in Kandahar: the status of internally-displaced persons (IDPs). Research and interviews for this effort were conducted in May and June 2010 with academics and researchers with recent experience in Afghanistan from the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Institute for the Study of War, the U.S. Central Command’s Center of Excellence, and the Canadian Ministry of Defense...” (P. 1).

## Security

*Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: mid-year report 2010.* Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), 2010. 28 p. [http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Aug102010\\_HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20MID-YEAR%20REPORT\\_ENG%20FINAL.pdf](http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Documents/Aug102010_HUMAN%20RIGHTS%20MID-YEAR%20REPORT_ENG%20FINAL.pdf) (484 KB). “The human cost of the armed conflict in Afghanistan is escalating in 2010. In the first six months of the year civilian casualties - including deaths and injuries of civilians - increased by 31 per cent over the same period in 2009. Three quarters of all civilian casualties were linked to Anti-Government Elements (AGEs), an increase of 53 per cent from 2009. At the same time, civilian casualties attributed to Pro-Government Forces (PGF) decreased by 30 per cent compared to the first half of 2009. UNAMA Human Rights (HR) highlights two critical developments that increased harm to civilians in 2010. First, the number of civilians assassinated and executed by AGEs rose dramatically and second, AGEs used a greater number of larger and more sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) throughout the country. The devastating human impact of these tactics underscores that nine years into the conflict, measures to protect Afghan

civilians effectively and to minimize the impact of the conflict on basic human rights are more urgent than ever. Between 01 January and 30 June 2010, UNAMA HR documented 3,268 civilian casualties including 1,271 deaths and 1,997 injuries. AGEs were responsible for the deaths and injuries of 2,477 civilians or 76 per cent of the total number of civilian casualties for this period. Suicide and IED attacks caused the most civilian casualties attributed to AGEs including 557 deaths (61 per cent of civilian deaths attributed to AGEs) and 1,137 injuries (73 per cent of civilian injuries attributed to AGEs)." (Executive summary).

**"Afghanistan: the Relationship Gap."** [London?]: International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), 2010. 76 p. [http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan\\_relationship\\_gap.pdf](http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan_relationship_gap.pdf) (2.3 MB). "To assess the attitude of the Afghan people towards key issues, the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) interviewed 552 Afghan men across Kandahar and Helmand provinces in June 2010." (Executive summary).

**Berman, Gavin.** "The Cost of Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [London]: House of Commons Library, 8 June, 2010. 7 p. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snsg-03139.pdf> (120 KB). "This note provides a summary of the estimated and actual costs of the international military operations. The Chancellor has set aside approximately £7.8bn in the special reserve to cover the cost of operations in Iraq and other international obligations. The outturn cost of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Balkans has totalled £13.3bn between 2002/03 and 2008/09. Expenditure in 2009/10 is expected to be £4.5bn." (Cover).

**Burke, Edward.** "Spain's War in Afghanistan." [Madrid?]: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), January 2010. 5 p. [http://www.fride.org/download/PB\\_Spain\\_Afghanistan\\_ENG\\_jan10.pdf](http://www.fride.org/download/PB_Spain_Afghanistan_ENG_jan10.pdf) (200 KB). "Spain has been a useful but low-key contributor to the mission in Afghanistan. It has undertaken valuable civilian work; its military role has been more circumscribed. Spain's defence minister now makes an eloquent case for a more robust Spanish engagement to turn back the Taliban insurgency. She is not backed unequivocally by other members of the government. The EU presidency provides an opportunity but also challenges Spain to lead a positive European response to president Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan. Steps are needed on both the military and civilian sides, and especially in linking these two dimensions more systematically." (Highlights, p. 1).

**Canada's Engagement in Afghanistan 2011-2014: Draft.** [2010?]. 7 p. <http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/36334137-Afghan-Report.pdf> (388 KB).

A brief presentation about the Canadian government's assistance and involvement in Afghanistan for 2011-2014 (some wording appears to have been deleted).

**Condra, Luke N. ... [et al.]** "The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq." Cambridge, Ma. [USA]: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2010. 69 p. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16152.pdf> (1.1 MB). "How are insurgents able to mobilize the population to fight and withhold valuable information from government forces? More specifically, what role does government mistreatment of non-combatants play? We study these questions by using uniquely-detailed micro-data from Afghanistan and Iraq to assess the impact of civilian casualties on insurgent violence. By comparing the data along temporal, spatial, and gender dimensions we are able to distinguish short-run "information" and "capacity" effects from the longer run "recruiting" and "revenge" effects. In Afghanistan we find strong evidence for a revenge effect in that local exposure to ISAF generated civilian casualties drives increased insurgent violence over the long-run. Matching districts with similar past trends in violence shows that counterinsurgent-generated civilian casualties from a typical incident are responsible for 1 additional violent incident in an average sized district in the following 6 weeks. There is no evidence of short run effects in Afghanistan, thus ruling out the information and the capacity mechanisms. Critically, we find no evidence of a similar reaction to civilian casualties in Iraq, suggesting insurgents' mobilizing tools may be quite conflict-specific. Our results suggest that minimizing harm to civilians will indeed help counterinsurgent forces in Afghanistan minimize insurgent attacks." (Abstract).

**Cordesman, Anthony** "The Need to Refocus Afghan Metrics and Narratives on Key Local Areas and Population Centers." Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), 2010. 9 p. [http://csis.org/files/publication/100722\\_AfghanOperMetrics.final.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/100722_AfghanOperMetrics.final.pdf) (764 KB). This paper makes a case for more local level (i.e. district and provincial) reporting about progress in Afghanistan.

**Dyrud, Felisa.** "White Paper: Afghan Air Force (AAF) Progress Since November 2009." September 2010. 2 p. "The Afghan Air Force, re-named in June 2010 from Afghan National Army Air Corps, plays a key role in the development of a professional Afghan military. The concentration in airlift capabilities reflects the country's terrain and the necessity to support ground forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations. The AAF, along with the Air Interdiction Unit (AIU) that supports the MoI, made steady progress this year towards becoming a professional, fully independent, operationally capable, and sustainable force by the year 2016." (P. 1).

Edwards, Ryan. "A Review of War Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan." Cambridge, Ma. [USA]: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2010. 38 p. <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16163.pdf> (156 KB). A review of the history of cost forecasts for these wars and evaluation of the background behind them.

Fair, C. Christine. "India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints." New York: Century Foundation, 2010. 26 p. <http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/fair.pdf> (550 KB). "This report outlines India's current interests in Afghanistan, how it has sought to achieve its aims, and the consequences of its actions for India, Pakistan, and the international efforts to stabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan. It argues that India's interests in Afghanistan are not only Pakistan-specific but also, equally, if not more important, tied to India's desire to be, and to be seen, as an extra-regional power moving toward great power status. This argument is elaborated in several parts. First, the report contextualizes India's interests in Afghanistan within the larger canvas of India's security interests in its extended strategic neighborhood. Second, it details India's specific objectives in Afghanistan, and third, it draws out the various means by which India has sought to achieve those objectives. The final section examines the implications for Afghanistan's future and, by extension, regional security." (P. 4)

Giustozzi, Antonio. "The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns." Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 2010. 15 p. [http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/CIGI\\_TalibanBeyondPashtuns\\_2010-07-22\\_.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/CIGI_TalibanBeyondPashtuns_2010-07-22_.pdf) (675 KB). "Although the Taliban remain a largely Pashtun movement in terms of their composition, they have started making significant inroads among other ethnic groups. In many cases, the Taliban have co-opted, in addition to bandits, disgruntled militia commanders previously linked to other organizations, and the relationship between them is far from solid. There is also, however, emerging evidence of grassroots recruitment of small groups of ideologically committed Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik Taliban. While even in northern Afghanistan the bulk of the insurgency is still Pashtun, the emerging trend should not be underestimated." (Abstract).

"Human Terrain in Spin Boldak District, Kandahar Afghanistan." [S.I.]: Human Terrain Team AF8, January 2010. 66 p. A brief study to investigate commerce, customs revenue, taxation, security, employment, development, tribal dynamics, land ownership, health, gender issues, education, and water in this border district of Kandahar Province. Visits were made to 46 villages and interviews done with hundreds of people (73 detailed interviews were conducted).

"Kandahar City Living Conditions and Perceptions of the Marjeh Military Operation: SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report." Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, April, 2010. 15 p. "To learn about local attitudes for this report, six Afghan Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) each spoke with five Afghan males, and these discussions took place throughout Kandahar City. The responses of the Afghan respondents provide a portrait of commonly expressed attitudes and feelings regarding the local living conditions, local security concerns and their attitudes towards the Marjeh military operation in Helmand Province."

*Kandahar Province Survey Report.* Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, 2010. 65 p. [http://www.wired.com/images\\_blogs/dangerroom/2010/04/kandahar-province-survey-report-5-apr-2010-for-isaf.pdf](http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/04/kandahar-province-survey-report-5-apr-2010-for-isaf.pdf) (2.13 MB). A total of 1,994 people in nine districts of Kandahar Province were interviewed about security, attitudes towards Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) recruitment, corruption, political legitimacy and reconciliation issues.

Kilcullen, David J. "Perspectives on Reconciliation Options in Afghanistan: Prepared Statement." Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, 28 July 2010. [http://www.feedblitz.com/t2.asp?/264759/21174235/3888945/http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Kilcullen\\_SenateTestimony.pdf](http://www.feedblitz.com/t2.asp?/264759/21174235/3888945/http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/Kilcullen_SenateTestimony.pdf) (140 KB). 4 p. Testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee summarizing the current US anti-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan.


Lunn, Jon and Ben Smith. "The AfPak Policy and the Pashtuns." London: House of Commons Library, 22 June, 2010. 81 p. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/rp2010/RP10-045.pdf> (1.7 MB). "In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that sought to combine military, civilian, political and development 'surges' on both sides of the Durand Line. The new policy soon became known by the shorthand term, 'AfPak'. The core goal of the policy is "to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan". In April 2009, the then Labour Government set out its own "comprehensive strategy", in which it was stated that the "greatest international priority [...] is the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan." These border areas are predominantly inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns, from whom are drawn most of the membership of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, the two groups believed to be providing shelter and assistance to al-Qaeda. The fate of the US AfPak policy currently hangs in the balance. There is certainly no shortage of sceptics. It is clear that the success or failure of the policy will

be heavily shaped by how the Pashtuns respond to its inducements. Therefore, the first part of this paper focuses on the Pashtuns. It begins with a survey of the geographic, historical and cultural factors which have shaped Pashtun identities in Afghanistan and Pakistan before going on to describe the political and security arrangements under which they currently live. The paper then reviews the Pashtun armed militant groups currently operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The second part of the paper then looks at the US AfPak policy, setting out its origins and evolution before assessing the prospects for success over the coming year and beyond.” (P. 1)

**Lunn, Jon and Ben Smith. “The AfPak Policy: Origins and Evolution.”** [London]: House of Commons Library, 19 March, 2010. 7 p. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-05411.pdf> (880 KB). “Following his inauguration as President in January 2009, Barack Obama initiated an interagency review of US policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It rapidly became clear that the new Administration was thinking in terms of a more integrated, regional policy, which soon became known by the shorthand term, ‘AfPak’. This note, which is mainly descriptive in nature, briefly surveys the origins and subsequent evolution of the AfPak policy, providing links to key official reports and documents. It does not offer a comprehensive analysis of the current situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” (Cover).

**Lunn, Jon and Ben Smith. “Political and Security Arrangements in the Pakistan Border Areas with Afghanistan.”** [London]: House of Commons Library, 22 March, 2010. 6 p. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snia-05413.pdf> (74 KB). “This note outlines the current political and security arrangements in the ethnic Pashtun-dominated areas on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). Critics consider these arrangements to be anomalous and to have contributed to the rise and spread of armed militancy in the FATA and PATA, which have become the heartlands of groups such as the Pakistan Taliban.” (Cover).

**Mettelsiefen, Marcel and Christoph Reuter. Kunduz, 4. September 2009: eine Spurensuche.** Berlin: Rogner & Bernhard, 2010. 127 p. This book presents colour portraits of relatives of individuals killed in the airstrike (called in by German forces) on a stolen fuel tanker near



Kunduz on the night of 3-4 September 2009. This is the first time since the Second World War that a German officer has ordered such a deadly attack, and a German photographer and journalist have compiled the photographs and other paperwork to provide depth of documentation for this tragedy.

**“A New Way Forward?: Rethinking US Strategy in Afghanistan”** [Washington, D.C.]: Afghanistan Study Group, August 16, 2010. 12 p. [http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/NewWayForward\\_report.pdf](http://www.afghanistanstudygroup.org/NewWayForward_report.pdf) (2.9 MB). “The U.S. war in Afghanistan is now the longest in our history, and is costing the U.S. taxpayers nearly \$100 billion per year, roughly seven times more than Afghanistan’s annual gross national product (GNP) of \$14 billion. Prosecuting the war in Afghanistan is not essential to U.S. security. We have justified expanding our commitment by saying the goal was eradicating Al Qaeda. Yet Al Qaeda is no longer a significant presence in Afghanistan. There are only some 400 hard-core Al Qaeda members remaining in the entire Af/Pak theatre. The conflict in Afghanistan is commonly perceived as a struggle between the Karzai government and an insurgent Taliban movement, allied with international terrorists, who are seeking to overthrow that government. In fact, the conflict is a civil war about power-sharing with lines of contention that are 1) partly ethnic, chiefly, but not exclusively, between Pashtuns who dominate the south and other ethnicities such as Tajiks and Uzbeks who are more prevalent in the north, 2) partly rural vs. urban, particularly within the Pashtun community, and 3) partly sectarian. With the U.S. intervention in force, the conflict has also come to include resistance to what is seen as foreign military occupation. Resolving the conflict in Afghanistan has primarily to do with resolving the distribution of power among these factions, and between the central government and the provinces, and with appropriately decentralizing authority.” (P. 1).

**Riedel, Bruce. “Obama’s War: Prospects for the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”** Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation, September 2010. 9 p. [http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan\\_Paper\\_7\\_0.pdf](http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan_Paper_7_0.pdf) (552 KB). “On coming into office, President Barak Obama immediately assembled a team to assess the US situation in Afghanistan and formulate a strategy for the mission. Heading up this team was Bruce Riedel, a former adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush and a former CIA officer. This paper, based on a CIGI Signature Lecture given by Mr. Riedel in April 2010, discusses the history of the US war on terror since 9/11, specifically the actors involved in initiating the al-Qaeda declaration of war on the US and its allies, and the recent terrorist plots and attacks linked to al-Qaeda, which demonstrate that al-Qaeda and its

allies continue to mount terrorist attacks despite the efforts of the US to thwart terrorism.” (P. 2).

Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez and Antonio Giustozzi. “Networks and Armies: Structuring Rebellion in Colombia and Afghanistan.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 22: 836-853 (2010). “Until recently, the importance of organizational factors in the understanding of the variance of the behavior of state challengers had not been recognized. New studies and theories have underscored its crucial character. This article contends that challengers can be placed in a continuum constituted by two opposed polar types, army like and network associations, and compare the Afghan Taliban’s and the Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—FARC)’s organizational principles from this point of view. The main claim is that organizationally inspired explanations behave much better than resource inspired ones when accounting for the differences between the Taliban and the FARC.” (Abstract).

Schirch, Lisa. “The Civil Society-Military Relationship in Afghanistan.” Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 24 September, 2010. 5 p. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2056%20The%20Civil%20Society-Military%20Relationship%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf> (316 KB). “The intense challenge of coordinating government civilians with military actors in the International Security Assistance Forces’ Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan has inhibited development of military relationships with civil society. The counterinsurgency strategy of ‘shape, clear, hold, build’ invites civil society organizations (CSOs) to play key roles in the final ‘build’ stage at the operational level. Yet many CSOs resist ‘coordination’ in a mission and strategy different from their own. CSOs seek greater policy dialogue and ‘communication’ with high-level ISAF decision makers, particularly during planning stages. An ongoing, high-level forum for civil society-military policy dialogue could help address tensions, provide a mechanism for CSOs to share their conflict assessments, and explore areas for possible collaboration such as in security sector reform.” (Summary).

“Shah Wali Khot District and Northern Arghandab: the Economy and the People.” [S.I.]: Human Terrain Team AF8, March 22, 2010. 39 p. “During February and March 2010, AF8 Human Terrain Team conducted a commerce study in the Shah Wali Khot district and northern Arghandab...the data included 73 detailed interviews from individuals ranging from farmers and shopkeepers to government personnel.” (Executive summary).

“The Strategic Framework for US Efforts in Afghanistan.” Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), June 2010. 13 p. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10655r.pdf> (5.2 MB). This document (1) identifies and describes key US and international strategies and plans that collectively guide US efforts in Afghanistan, (2) provides examples and information about key efforts to assist Afghanistan, (3) identifies oversight issues for the US Congress to consider. The lists of Afghan government, US and NATO strategies and agreements are a useful reference.

Taylor, Chris. “Afghanistan: Towards a Handover of Security Responsibility?” [London]: House of Commons Library, 20 August, 2010. 35 p. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snias-05678.pdf> (135 KB). “In the last year the military campaign in Afghanistan has taken on a fresh slant as Coalition allies have moved towards counterinsurgency operations that emphasise population security, and have begun drawing up longer term plans to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces with a view to transitioning security control to the ANSF from the end of 2010 in order that Coalition military forces can begin to withdraw from mid-2011.” (Cover). This paper examines whether the timetable for that transition may be too ambitious.

Taylor, Claire. “Military Campaign in Afghanistan.” [London]: House of Commons Library, 14 July 2010. 48 p. <http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snias-05227.pdf> (648 KB). A summary of the background to British involvement in Afghanistan, including a review of developments in 2009 (US “surge” and election support, the McChrystal report), with a discussion of the way forward (the positions of the US, the British, and Coalition allies, overview of the London Conference in January 2010). Followed by summaries of recent developments: McChrystal’s resignation, British forces in ISAF, progress of the military campaign in the southern provinces and NATO’s roadmap for security transition.

“War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress,” Steve Bowman, Catherine Dale. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 8 June 2010. 71 p. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40156.pdf> (500 KB). Useful periodic summary of recent events with contextual overview.


“Wardak and Logar Provincial Perceptions Qualitative Indicators: SME [Subject Matter Expert] Report.” Burlington, Massachusetts: Glevum Associates, May 2010. 27 p. “A total of fifty interviews were conducted with respondents in Wardak and Logar

Provinces. Those interviewed in Wardak were from Chak and Jaghatoo districts, while the Logar Province respondents were from Baraki Barak, Charkh, and Kharwar districts. Ten respondents were interviewed in each of the five districts to provide a general overview and understanding of the concerns in the regions covered. The in-depth-interview method used in this Subject Matter Expert report is designed to explore topics in depth and access the sensitive concerns of respondents, but it is not designed to produce results which are statistically representative. Thus, the conclusions and findings cannot be guaranteed to carry over to the general population of the local area.” (P. 4).

“Warlord Inc.: Extortion and Corruption along the US Supply Chain in Afghanistan: Report of the Majority Staff.”. [Washington, D.C.: US House of Representatives], June 2010. 79 p. [http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS\\_Subcommittee/6.22.10\\_HNT\\_HEARING/Warlord\\_Inc\\_compress.pdf](http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS_Subcommittee/6.22.10_HNT_HEARING/Warlord_Inc_compress.pdf) (11 MB). “[T]he Department of Defense designed a contract that put responsibility for the security of vital U.S. supplies on contractors and their unaccountable security providers.

This arrangement has fueled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, corrupt Afghan officials, and perhaps others. Not only does the system run afoul of the Department’s own rules and regulations mandated by Congress, it also appears to risk undermining the U.S. strategy for achieving its goals in Afghanistan. To be sure, Afghanistan presents an extremely difficult environment for military operations, logistics, and business practices. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that little attention was given to the cost-benefit analysis of allowing the system to continue in a fashion that injected a good portion of a \$2.16 billion contract’s resources into a corruptive environment. The ‘fog of war’ still requires a direct line of sight on contractors.” (P [1]).


“Western Zhari: the People, Leaders, Tribes and the Economy.” [S.l.]: Human Terrain Team AF8, May 2010. 41 p. Human Terrain Team AF8 conducted a



study in Western Zhari from March to May 2010, looking at the leaders, the tribal structures, the economy and potential for development in the area.” (Executive summary).


Woodward, Bob. *Obama’s Wars*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. xviii, 441 p. ISBN 9781439172490. “Woodward tells the inside story of Obama making the critical decisions on the Afghanistan War, the secret campaign in Pakistan and the world-wide fight against terrorism.” (Cover).

## Urban Issues



Turkstra, Jan. “Incremental Regularization of Informal Settlements, the UN-HABITAT Approach: Achieving Development and Security: the Case of Kandahar, Afghanistan.” Kabul: Governance and Development Support Programme [GDSP], UN-HABITAT, [2009?]. [7] p. [http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/projects/afghanistan/pdf/PRJ\\_090604173455\\_1.pdf](http://www.fukuoka.unhabitat.org/projects/afghanistan/pdf/PRJ_090604173455_1.pdf) (746 KB). Outline of a project in District 9 in Kandahar City to progressively register and provide title to people living in informal settlements.

Turkstra, Jan and Abdul Baqi Popal. “Peace building in Afghanistan through Settlement Regularization.” 2010. 6 p. [http://www.isocarp.net/Data/case\\_studies/1639.pdf](http://www.isocarp.net/Data/case_studies/1639.pdf) (1.4 MB). “The Governance and Development Support Programme (GDSP), funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and implemented by UN-HABITAT, aims at an integrated community based approach to improve the living conditions of low-income families living in informal settlements in Kandahar city. Besides upgrading the programme is also aiming to increase the security of tenure. The project contributes to the security and consolidation of the inhabitants of a large informal settlement benefiting some 100,000 people. Even more important is that the UN-Habitat approach of incremental regularization of informal settlements in Afghanistan is based on an agreement between the community and the local and central Government and aims to strengthen local Governance through an effective city-community partnership to achieve improved living conditions and security of tenure. The Kandahar experience is currently also implemented in Lashkar Gah through the Strengthening Municipal and Community Development project funded by DFID. In short, Settlement Regularization is the integration of upgrading through community empowerment



and tenure security. This paper describes firstly the process of community development which goes far beyond just participation in development processes but gives also the community access to budgets to implement projects. Secondly the paper looks into the incremental process to increase the tenure security of the inhabitants of informal settlements and the last paragraph deals with strategic municipal action planning and how the positive elements of informal settlements can be combined with formal development of settlements to develop urban land at scale and affordable.” (P. 1).


## Women

“Afghanistan, the ‘Ten-Dollar Talib’ and Women’s Rights: Afghan Women and the Risks of Reintegration and Reconciliation.” New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010. 65 p. <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0710webwcover.pdf> (1.4 MB). “This report describes continuing abuses of women’s rights by the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin) in areas under their control over the past several years. It also highlights the concerns of Afghan women about possible deals with the Taliban and other insurgent

groups under the rubric of “reintegration” (programs to encourage lower-level fighters to stop fighting) and “reconciliation” (peace negotiations with insurgent commanders) and offers recommendations on what such initiatives should include to protect women’s rights.” (P. 5).

“Fact Sheets.” Kabul: UNIFEM Afghanistan, February 2010. [14] p. <http://afghanistan.unifem.org/media/pubs/factSheet/10/index.html> (HTML files, 1.7 MB). This web-page provides links to summaries of indicative statistics about women in Afghanistan. The categories are: population, health, education, marriage, labour force, political participation, justice sector, security services, peace building, media, violence against women, and government commitments to women.

“Women’s Access to Justice in Western Afghanistan.” Herat, Afghanistan: Women Activities [sic] and Social Services Association (WASSA), 2010. 85 p. Research was conducted on “women’s access to justice” in Herat, Badghis, Ghor, Farah and Nimroz using questionnaires and interviews. 313 women and 187 men were talked to by a group of 14 research staff (7 women, 7 men).



## New Laws Received

Official Gazette no.	Date of Publication	Name of law
1017	4 April 2010	Presidential Decree on Effective and Practical Combat against Corruption
1017	4 April 2010	Regulation on Arranging Judge’s Uniform and Maintaining Cleanness in the Office
1018	20 April 2010	Registration of Commercial Documents and Trademarks
1022	20 May 2010	Registration of Commercial Documents and Trademarks
1027	30 June 2010	Registration of Commercial Documents and Trademarks