RUNNING OUT OF OPTIONS
Tracing Rural Afghan Livelihoods

Paula Kantor and Adam Pain

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Paula Kantor
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Glossary

ailaq  summer pasture for grazing animals

gilim  type of flat woven carpet

khairat religious charity; often given as a meal prepared in the mosque for the poor of the village, sponsored either by several villagers or one wealthy household

palas  type of flat, woven carpet with simple pattern

pau  unit of weight equivalent to just under half a kilogramme

qalin  type of woven carpet consisting of a pile knotted into a textile backing

shura  community council

ushr religious charity; given by landowners to poor villagers consisting of ten percent of the harvest

zakat religious charity; one percent of harvest and/or livestock holdings, offered to the poor once per year

Acronyms

ARD  agriculture and rural development

AREDP  Afghanistan Rural Enterprise Development Program

AREU  Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

CDC  Community Development Council

GoA  Government of Afghanistan

MISFA  Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan

MoLSAMD  Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled

MoPH  Ministry of Public Health

NGO  nongovernmental organisation

NSP  National Solidarity Programme

NRVA  National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

WFP  World Food Program
Running out of Options: Tracing Rural Afghan Livelihoods

In 2002-03, AREU research teams documented the livelihoods of dozens of rural households across seven Afghan provinces. New research suggests that toward the end of the decade, many of these same households struggle to meet day to day needs, and are even worse off than before. Their futures are clouded by uncertainty and by a lack of good quality livelihood options that could bring security.

This paper examines how and why the livelihoods of 64 households from eight villages across Badakhshan, Kandahar and Sar-i-Pul Provinces have changed between 2002 and 2009. It found that while many have experienced improvements in access to basic services since 2002, livelihood security—whether a household’s skills, assets and activities are enough to make and sustain a living—has declined for the majority. Changes outside of their control, including drought, the ban on opium poppy cultivation and rising global food prices, led to large decreases in agricultural production or threatened food security. Those involved in nonfarm employment intensified their work in response; they were joined by new entrants seeking ways to earn cash income. Both of these responses drove down wages and depressed the job market. At the same time, dependence on those providing access to employment, charity, food aid and credit increased.

Within this economic and social context, coping with ill-health or meeting the cost of vital social engagements such as weddings became increasingly difficult; some could no longer afford healthcare while others delayed marriages. Many households found themselves sinking ever deeper into debt; those without male labourers were often left with little option but to marry their daughters young to secure whatever bride price they could.

Virtually all households who were able to maintain or improve their livelihood security did so by diversifying out of agriculture. However, reducing reliance on farming was not a guaranteed strategy. Most declining households diversified away from agriculture into nonfarm work as well, either in Afghanistan or in neighbouring countries. However, this was more often a forced response to the opium poppy cultivation ban, drought conditions, or a mixture of the two. The households with improving and stable livelihood security more often diversified based on skills or connections that gave them access to higher quality nonfarm employment, specifically salaried work. Location also mattered. The majority of those with improving or stable livelihood security were found in Kandahar. Political connections and initial wealth helped drive some households to rapid improvements in livelihood security, often helped by poor villagers’ dependence on them for work. For others, access to Kandahar’s vibrant informal urban economy provided opportunities for small improvements. Household composition also played a role: those with more male workers were generally better placed to diversify more effectively. Limits on women’s economic activities and girls’ education constrain household diversification potential today and in future, threatening women’s individual security as well as household outcomes.

Many respondent households were wary of engaging with markets, which raises questions about the strong emphasis in current agriculture and rural development (ARD) policy on market-oriented agricultural production. This level of cautiousness suggests that a more measured approach to market-led growth is needed. In many areas, stabilising livelihoods and achieving food security would seem to be first steps before encouraging increased market engagement. This means giving subsistence production equal attention in ARD programmes. For families in more remote regions with fewer viable options for market production, improving subsistence production can form part of a social protection strategy. This should be augmented with opportunities to access training and education so those wishing to leave agriculture can do so on better terms than currently possible.

The considerable risks associated with agricultural livelihoods and doubts over the sector’s viability in the medium-term also point to the need to invest

Executive Summary

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The considerable risks associated with agricultural livelihoods and doubts over the sector’s viability in the medium-term also point to the need to invest
in urban development and job creation. Given that households’ pursuit of livelihood strategies is rarely confined to a single geographic space, these efforts should be part of a realistic rural development strategy. Rural development should not be about rural locations but about rural residents. Similarly, the extension of rural residents’ livelihood activities into neighbouring countries highlights the need to protect labour migrants from the risk of exploitation.

Social protection needs to not only fill deficits in access to resources but also to secure the ability of all Afghans to move out of poverty. This means securing their ability to pursue their livelihoods with greater autonomy and less vulnerability to exploitation or abuse of power. The data from this study is full of examples of inequality and dependence placing limits on the choices people have and their ability to succeed in pursuing them. Examples include gender norms, unequal employment relationships, sharecrop arrangements, and the ability of local powerholders in some villages to co-opt resources meant for the village as a whole. Aid actors need to acknowledge the influence these systems have and identify ways to work with local communities to begin transforming them.

All of these considerations should form parts of a joined-up approach to improving livelihood security which protects the most vulnerable, prevents damaging loss after shocks such as ill-health or failed harvests, promotes improved capacities and transforms existing inequalities. Key areas for policy attention include:

- Reducing risks related to the variability of agricultural output
- Improving the quantity and quality of nonfarm employment opportunities
- Expanding the types of financial services provided to include savings and insurance products
- Assisting households to cope with high health costs
- Identifying appropriate ways to manage spending levels on social events
- Enhancing education quality and accessibility to improve its promotive potential
- Building from local, informal means of social assistance to develop formal programmes where easy access and transparency are assured
- Integrating attention to the social context and existing inequalities into development programme design and implementation
1. Introduction

Constant change has characterised life in Afghanistan, from the turmoil of its decades of conflict through to the triumphs and disappointments of the period since 2001. For some, new economic opportunities and access to services have led to improvements in living standards. But drought and rising physical insecurity have inflicted damaging blows to the well-being of many others. Rural residents have carved diverse paths to securing their livelihoods throughout the political, social and economic turbulence of the past decades. Their resilience in doing so, resting on informal structures rooted in community relationships and only weakly supported by the state and market institutions, has been remarkable. However, differences in village and household characteristics make the outcomes of these institutions and relationships variable. Those with resources or connections to powerful patrons can accumulate considerable wealth. This dependence on connections is shared by those less socially or materially well-off, but in most cases these connections are used to reduce uncertainty, and not to prosper. Their use frequently comes at the cost of dependence on those who can offer security, and the relationships often require constant investment to preserve them. Poverty reduction therefore requires interventions which reduce not only risk and uncertainty, but also the need of the marginalised and less powerful to depend on others for their livelihoods. Better knowledge of the sources of risk rural Afghans face and variations in how they can manage them is needed to inform such efforts.

This paper is the culmination of a broader research project which aims to provide this knowledge. It draws from a multi-year study of rural livelihood change which collected in-depth qualitative data from 64 households in eight villages spread across three provinces, along with village-level data from three communities in a fourth. By examining experiences of rural livelihood change, it seeks to identify the complex range of risks, uncertainties and opportunities rural households across a range of contexts and wealth levels faced, how they were able to respond to them, and what consequences this had for their livelihood security. It builds from previous papers which established the importance of social relationships and patronage in helping rural Afghan households survive or flourish, and the need to understand local context in designing and implementing livelihood programmes.

Based on findings from previous papers, this synthesis paper compares the livelihood trajectories of households and villages across different geographic, economic and social backgrounds. It not only assesses economic risks affecting income and consumption levels but also the risks posed by social inequalities, which determine how different groups are included in society and the range of choices open to them. The inclusion of social risks also responds to more recent developments in broader understandings of rural livelihoods.


4 The study was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), grant number RES-167-25-0285. As discussed in section 3, the methods used in Faryab (the fourth province) differed due to the security context.

of risk and social protection, which acknowledge that addressing risks from both of these sources is necessary to achieve sustainable reductions in poverty.

Based on the case households’ experiences, the paper identifies key policy areas which can address both types of risk. A detailed understanding of how and why livelihoods change over time is of central importance to informing efforts to promote growth and reduce rural poverty. If used, it can ensure that these efforts are appropriately targeted, reflect the complex realities of rural life and enable as many people to improve their livelihoods—and lives—as possible.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 develops the conceptual framework for the study, focusing on risk, vulnerability and social protection; Section 3 outlines study methodology and village contexts; Section 4 presents the case evidence of livelihood change, exploring patterns of improvement and decline in the face of both positive and negative experiences; Section 5 expands these observations into a series of policy prescriptions; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
The International Fund for Agriculture and Development’s (IFAD) recently released *Rural Poverty Report 2011* highlights the need to pay greater attention to risk reduction as part of efforts to enhance rural development and growth. It acknowledges the central role agriculture and the rural nonfarm economy can play in promoting development in some of the world’s poorer nations, but only if existing and emerging sources of uncertainty can be managed. These include natural resource degradation, climate change, and changes in domestic and global markets for agricultural products. Past research from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) supports the application of these assertions to Afghanistan.

In order to better help rural residents to avoid and cope with risk and reduce vulnerability to poverty, clarity in understanding the types and sources of risk people face is needed. This section lays out both an understanding of risk that is suited to the Afghan context and the approach to social protection with which it corresponds.

### 2.1 Risk and vulnerability

“Vulnerability” emerged as a development concern in response to the static nature of existing research on poverty. This tended to provide snapshots of households at a single point in time that failed to capture the dynamic forces influencing livelihood security and experiences of poverty. Vulnerability is therefore a more complex concept which is geared toward capturing changes in socioeconomic status over time rather than taking it as a starting point, and is defined as exposure to risk of being or becoming poor. The extent of people’s vulnerability to poverty is determined by their ability to respond to risk without damaging losses to current or future well-being. Households and individuals vary in their capacities to respond to risk, leading to different livelihood outcomes.

Combining both social and economic considerations gives interventions more scope to target the causes of vulnerability to poverty as well as its symptoms. Since these causes lie in how societies operate, a major part of dealing with them involves effecting a degree of transformation within society itself.

“Risk”—the probability of a loss happening—is therefore central to the definition of vulnerability, and differences in how policymakers understand sources and types of risk affect their approaches to reducing vulnerability to poverty. The World Bank’s Social Risk Management (SRM) framework represents an early effort to understand risk and social protection from an economic perspective. It is based on the assertion that the poor are the most exposed to risk and that they have the least resources available to respond to it. These

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7 Lorene Flaming and Alan Roe, “Opportunities for Pro-Poor Agricultural Growth” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2009); Christopoulos, “Out of Stepl”; Paula Kantor, “From Access to Impact: Microcredit and Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2009).


principles thus imply that the poor are the most vulnerable due to the high negative impact of shocks on their welfare. High levels of vulnerability are expected to lead the poor to avoid risk as much as possible, even if this comes at the expense of higher returns. This understanding leads the SRM framework to focus on finding ways to manage income and consumption risks to enable the poor to engage in more lucrative activities that are more likely to lift them out of poverty. In doing so, it identifies the following three strategies:13

- Risk reduction: efforts to reduce the possibility of experiencing variations in income or consumption flows in the first place. These might include engaging in less risky livelihood activities, disease prevention or migration.
- Risk mitigation: efforts to reduce the impact of shocks on income or consumption. This may include diversifying people’s assets and livelihood activities, or providing forms of insurance from the market or informal sources such as social networks.
- Risk coping: actions after a shock or negative event to minimise its effects, such as borrowing, asset sales or mobilising more workers.

This framework has been important for attracting attention to the need to develop ways to manage risk. However, evidence from rural Afghanistan demonstrates that in addition to economic factors, social inequalities and social relationships have a particularly important effect on household livelihood strategies and outcomes.14 They can be thought of as forms of chronic risk which make and maintain the marginal status of certain social groups, such as women.15

In addition, social factors such as discrimination and marginalisation affect the abilities of different groups to respond to risks. Resource deficits coupled with poor social positions may mean less privileged groups are forced to choose responses that are far more damaging and irreversible than those available to the more socially and economically privileged.16 For example, they may be less able to diversify economic activities, turning instead to reducing consumption, forgoing health or education investments, having women work outside the home, or entering into exploitative relationships with patrons which provide little room to move out of poverty. This does not mean their actions are wholly determined by their social position, but that individuals act within a context influenced by history and existing social differences. Any framework defining risk to inform policy and programming in Afghanistan must therefore account for risks associated with the social context and how its societies work.

Combining both social and economic considerations gives interventions more scope to target the causes of vulnerability to poverty as well as its symptoms. Since these causes lie in how societies operate, a major part of dealing with them involves effecting a degree of transformation within society itself.17

2.2 Transformative social protection

Social protection describes the range of interventions developed and delivered to provide protection against risk. Initially the concept was limited to providing a minimum income to the most poor; it has since expanded to include preventative mechanisms and more recently to promoting capabilities and transforming social structures.18 “Transformative” social protection is

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15 Cook and Kabeer, “Exclusion, Deficits and Trajectories.”
16 Kabeer, “Safety Nets.”
a multi-faceted approach that incorporates all of these elements in an attempt to tackle both social and economic sources of risk.\textsuperscript{19} It is defined as:

...all initiatives that transfer income or assets to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the social status and rights of the marginalised; with the overall objectives of extending the benefits of economic growth and reducing the economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and marginalised people.\textsuperscript{20}

By combining these factors, it extends the focus of social protection to strengthening people's capacity to lift themselves out of poverty, and to addressing the structural constraints and unequal distributions that limit their efforts to do so.\textsuperscript{21} It is thus an approach well-suited to addressing the webs of power and inequality that underpin the livelihoods of so many in rural Afghanistan.

Transformative social protection employs four complimentary approaches. This framework will be applied to policy prescriptions set out later in this paper:\textsuperscript{22}

- **Protective**: filling deficits in people's basic needs. These tend to be narrowly-targeted resource transfers to the most poor including disability benefits, services for those needing care including orphanages, and the removal of access fees for basic services.
- **Preventive**: measures to prevent deprivation and directly alleviate poverty. These overlap with the SRM framework's risk reduction and mitigation measures and include both diversification and formal and informal social insurance programmes. These would reach both those in poverty as well as those at risk of becoming poor.
- **Promotive**: measures to stabilise and build people's incomes and capabilities. Examples include skills development to support diversification, and public works programmes that build quality economic infrastructure.
- **Transformative**: efforts to address social inequalities sustaining vulnerability to poverty. Examples include collective action to improve working conditions and legal protection against discrimination.

These measures are not mutually exclusive and interventions can occupy some or all categories depending on how they are designed and implemented.\textsuperscript{23} One example is school feeding programmes that encourage households to send their children to school instead of putting them to work. They can protect by helping households improve food security; they can promote by improving children’s access to better jobs in the long run; and they can also transform if school curricula address issues of social justice.

Transformative social protection is not without challenges in implementation, particularly in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{24} Some advocates have suggested that social protection become a mainstay of wider development investments, arguing that this would lead to a more coordinated, long-term approach instead of narrow short-term projects that address the symptoms of poverty instead of its causes.\textsuperscript{25} However, this clashes with the current political reality in Afghanistan, where pressure to show quick results trumps interest in dealing with the structural causes of poverty.


\textsuperscript{22} Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, “Social Protection for Transformation”; Cook and Kabeer, “Exclusion, Deficits and Trajectories.”


\textsuperscript{25} Cook and Kabeer, “Exclusion, Deficits and Trajectories.”
In a country fragmented by a myriad of competing interests, another critical challenge is establishing how desired social transformations are defined and by whom, to avoid impositions and excluding marginalised groups. This is further complicated by the difficulty of working for social change in a conflict situation. Social change is a political process. Agencies deciding to support transformative processes may risk the neutrality that provides them access to communities. However, not doing so may mean continued entrenchment of the social relations that keep people poor and can ultimately help drive conflict. Transformative social protection is therefore vital to providing a just and lasting base of support to all rural Afghans seeking to rebuild—and improve—their lives.
This section briefly describes the research approach and interview procedures the study followed in collecting its household-level case data. It then provides an overview of the eight study villages in Kandahar, Sar-i-Pul and Badakhshan where detailed research was conducted.²⁶

### 3.1 Research approach

This study builds from a previous study by AREU documenting the state of rural livelihoods in Afghanistan in 2002-03.²⁷ It revisited a selection of field sites from the initial study to understand how and why changes occurred in the lives and livelihoods of case study households over the period 2002-09. The current study sought to gain a detailed picture of the factors influencing rural livelihood change and how these varied across household, village and provincial contexts. Its focus was on investigating patterns of similarity and difference and why they exist. It therefore took a qualitative research approach to build an in-depth understanding of livelihood change from a small number of carefully selected household cases. The study was carried out in Kandahar, Badakhshan, Sar-i-Pul and Faryab.²⁸

There was some variation in how the study proceeded in each site. For Kandahar and Badakhshan, NGO partners Mercy Corps and the Aga Khan Foundation respectively carried out the fieldwork with training and monitoring from AREU. In Kandahar, Mercy Corps could only safely carry out research in two of the three villages from the earlier study. An AREU field team conducted the research in Sar-i-Pul and Faryab. However, recent insurgent incursions into the Faryab study district limited travel to the villages and did not allow for detailed household interviews. The Faryab case study therefore focused on issues at a village rather than household level and examined how two major changes in the study area—drought and rising insecurity—have affected lives and livelihoods across the three sites. Since this paper's focus is on individual households, it only draws on the Faryab findings to support patterns identified in the household data from the other eight villages.

### 3.2 Interview procedures

In-depth household interviews formed the main bulk of the fieldwork. The fieldwork teams were composed of two female and two male Afghan interviewers, guaranteeing they could speak to both male and female respondents. In total four interviews were held per household, two with men and two with women. These were augmented by data collected on the study villages and districts so that household experiences could be understood within broader local contexts. The stages followed in data collection are provided below.

- **Household profile**: Using the 2002-03 household data, a household profile was prepared for each of the originally interviewed households. The profile summarised basic data on household composition and economy in 2002-03.

- **Introductory interviews**: The interview team introduced themselves to the village, holding a focus group discussion with both men and women to collect general information about the village itself, and changes to livelihood activities and security since 2002-03. A series of introductory discussions then followed with all the original sample households still present in the village.²⁹ These interviews

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²⁶ For further detail on study methods in each province, see the relevant AREU case studies listed on page 3. For a more detailed description of the village contexts and their role in relation to livelihoods, see Pain and Kantor, “Understanding and Addressing Context.”

²⁷ Jo Grace and Adam Pain, “Rethinking Rural Livelihoods in Afghanistan” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004).

²⁸ Data for Kandahar was collected between August 2008 and March 2009; data for Badakhshan between August 2008 and July 2009; data for Sar-i-Pul between June 2008 and June 2009; and data for Faryab in November 2009.

²⁹ Generally three to four families were no longer living in each
were informed by the household profiles and explored changes within the household (such as composition or economy) and directions of household fortunes (improving, maintaining or declining).

- **Household selection**: Based on the introductory interview evidence, a sub-sample of eight households, proportional to the number of households in each wealth group in the original 20-household sample from the 2002-03 study, was selected for further interviews. Selection was guided by the desire for diversity according to wealth group, livelihood trajectory (when such variation existed), household size and composition, land holdings and livelihood portfolios.

- **Household interview guides and interviews**: A standard household interview guide structured around eight common themes was used across teams to ensure each one collected data on the same topics. Household interviews were carried out by the male and female teams, usually with the head of the household and the oldest woman (in the case of joint households), with each interviewed twice.

### 3.3 Study contexts

The demographics of the eight study villages are laid out in Table 1, along with their respective levels of service provision. The description focuses on basic services because they form a foundation for social protection.

The two Kandahar villages of Lalakai and Julan were located in Dand District, a ten to fifteen minute drive to Kandahar City. Residents used health and education services in the city as none were provided in the villages. Residents in Lalakai received power from the grid for about three hours per day; at other times the main landlord provided power through his own generator. In Julan, only those wealthy enough to own generators had access to electricity. Both villages access drinking water through communal or private bore wells.

The Sar-i-Pul villages of Kushlak, Pishin and Sarband are located in Sayyad District, one of the poorest in the province. All three have access to potable drinking water, though this service has less coverage in Sarband village. Some respondents in Sarband reported having to use others’ private wells for drinking water, making them dependent on others for access to this basic requirement. All three villages have a communally-owned generator, but only in Pishin have village leadership and residents been able to afford the fuel needed to run it. As the district centre, Pishin has a health clinic in the village, which residents of the other two villages travel short distances to access. Kushlak is the only village of the three without a boys’ or girls’ school. Not surprisingly, attendance here is lower than the others and girls in particular are not allowed to travel to the district centre to study. Some boys did so, sometimes aided by drought conditions which reduced farm work and left them free to study.

The Badakhshan villages of Shur Qul, Toghloq and Khilar are in Yamgan and Jurm Districts. Khilar is the smallest and most under-serviced of all the eight study villages. It does not have access to clean water, and its residents struggle with water-borne illnesses which have been vastly reduced in the other Badakhshan and Sar-i-Pul study villages with the installation of new drinking water services. It also lacks electricity, and residents have to travel to the valley to access the local schools and clinic. However, access to the valley has been improved by a new road funded by the village’s National Solidarity Programme (NSP).

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30 Across study villages one to two respondent households were in the highest wealth group, or 19 percent in total. Wealth groups were defined by elders in each study village during the 2002-03 study and were normally divided into poor, middle and wealthy.

31 These included household composition and structure, household history, home and services, land and agricultural production, income-generating work, credit and saving, links with the state and informal systems, and wider context.

32 For more detailed information on village history, geography and social structures see Pain and Kantor, “Understanding and Addressing Context”; and Kantor and Pain, “Securing Life and Livelihoods.”

33 All names of case villages and households are fictitious.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village name,* size, ethnicity</th>
<th>Potable water</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kandahar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalakai; 1000 families; Pashtun</td>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Access; fee for use; City power 3 hours/day; landlord provides generator power</td>
<td>In Kandahar city; 10-15 min drive</td>
<td>In Kandahar city, for boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julan; 412 families; Pashtun</td>
<td>Access</td>
<td>No access except for wealthy (own generators)</td>
<td>In Kandahar city; 10-15 min drive</td>
<td>In Kandahar city, for boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sar-i-Pul</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kushlak; 180 families; Uzbek</td>
<td>Access</td>
<td>No access; NSP generator unsustainable due to fuel costs</td>
<td>In district centre; 2 km away</td>
<td>In district centre; only boys allowed to travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pishin; 1200 families; Mainly Uzbek</td>
<td>Access in last 2 yrs</td>
<td>Access; fee for use</td>
<td>Clinic in village</td>
<td>Boys and girls schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarband; 1100 families; Arab and Pashtun</td>
<td>Access but some still access through relations with people with wells</td>
<td>No access; NSP generator unsustainable due to fuel costs</td>
<td>In district (20 km) or provincial centre (5 km)</td>
<td>Boys and girls schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Badakhshan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shur Qul; 302 families; Tajik</td>
<td>Access but poor quality equipment; broken for 2 yrs and recently fixed</td>
<td>Access; fee for use</td>
<td>Clinic in village</td>
<td>Boys and girls school; long history of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toghloq; 178 families; Tajik</td>
<td>Access in last 3 yrs; fee for use</td>
<td>Access in last 3 yrs</td>
<td>Go to Jurm, Baharak or Faisabad for treatment; Jurm 45 minute drive</td>
<td>Boys school; Girls school in last 5 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khilar; 44 families; Ismaili</td>
<td>No access</td>
<td>No access</td>
<td>In the valley; 1.5 hours walk</td>
<td>In the valley; 1.5 hours walk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For a table linking village names to codes used in individual case studies, see Appendix 3*
established Community Development Council (CDC). One of the male residents teaches at the girls’ school and enables greater access to female education by accompanying girls from the village there each day.

Both Shur Qul and Toghloq have drinking water, electricity and education facilities in the village. The drinking water infrastructure in Shur Qul had been broken for almost two years and was only recently fixed by an NGO, while NSP funds in both villages financed electricity infrastructure. Individuals paid for access to these services. Although some poor households struggled with this expense, they recognised its importance in supporting their children’s studies. Shur Qul has a clinic in the village though some respondent households travelled up to one hour to use an alternative clinic. Toghloq respondents reported travelling to Jurm, Baharak or Faizabad for treatment.

Since 2002 most of the study villages have seen improvements in the provision of social goods and in road connectivity.\textsuperscript{34} However, provision does not always mean access, particularly in the face of entrenched gender norms or when direct or opportunity costs of access are above what is affordable. While the positive changes represented by improved services cannot be ignored, evidence across the 64 respondent households suggests that this forms only part of a much broader collection of forces influencing rural livelihoods. The following analysis identifies the complex mix of factors influencing the direction of livelihood change and shows how for many households, life in recent years has become worse, not better.

\textsuperscript{34} A study by Altai Consulting confirms this; respondents reported positive changes due to access to social goods including female education, roads and electricity. See Altai Consulting, “Moving out of Poverty” (Kabul: Altai Consulting, 2006).
Figure 1: Location of study areas
Out of the 64 case households, 45–70 percent—experienced a drop in livelihood security. A range of factors largely outside of the households’ control, such as drought or the enforcement of a ban on opium cultivation, set the scene for this decline. Household-specific risks related to ill-health and high spending on social events such as weddings further added to the burden, as did a lack of viable alternative work to help cope with downturns in farming and livestock-rearing. The section starts with a summary of the factors that led a minority of households to improve their livelihood security, followed by a discussion of others managing to cope with the balance of positive and negative changes they experienced. It closes with a description of the complex interplay of factors that have led to the erosion of livelihood security for the large majority.

4.1 Improving households

Out of the 64 case households, 13 experienced improvements in livelihood security. Some built on their existing wealth, while others starting out with meagre resources were able to carve out a measure of prosperity. In many cases, and particularly for those starting from poorer positions, these upward changes have come slowly and gradually—far from the “springboards” described in some social protection literature. What is generally clear is that agriculture’s role in the livelihoods of these case households was generally a small or supportive one. Location was also a significant factor: 10 of the 13 improving households were from the two Kandahar villages.

In general, a combination of inherited wealth, connections, access to work, and for most, multiple male workers to support diversification, led to improved livelihood security. The experiences of a few households below give colour to this picture of improvement.

Wealth

Two respondent households started from positions of economic and social wealth and continued to build from this, aided by significant male labour resources and connections to political elites. In both cases having multiple sons enabled diversification into nonfarm activities which reduced the households’ exposure to risks associated with agricultural shortfalls caused by rain or pest infestations. The case of Haji Yaqoub (Julan-40) also exemplifies a predatory use of elite power most evident in the Kandahar villages, linked to the strong social inequalities which define village life in both Lalakai and Julan. Haji’s household is already land-rich and secures additional benefits from his position as head of the village shura (council) and his son’s car import business. However, he also reputedly confiscated land from one brother’s widow and a jewellery store from another, driving them into decline while further bolstering his own position.

Connections

Connections were another main driver of improvement, and were key in boosting the livelihoods of four other households. In each case, the household started with few productive assets and achieved varying levels of improvement based on their ability to expand on

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35 For improving and coping households case data is summarised in tables in Appendices 1 and 2. Given the number of declining households, case data is not presented in a table. Instead, the pattern of factors leading to decline is diagrammed and the interactions between elements discussed with relation to case examples.

36 This corresponds with findings of a multi-year multi-site study of livelihood change, where household routes out of poverty were found to be limited and often unsustainable. See Anirudh Krishna, One Illness Away: Why People Become Poor and How They Escape Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

37 See Appendix 1 for detailed characteristics of the case households.

38 Lalakai-10 and Julan-40.


40 Lalakai-05, Julan-42, Julan-57 and Julan-56.
them, mainly by shifting into nonfarm activities. Those with political connections and male family members to make use of them, like Haji Jamil’s household (Julan-42), experienced the largest improvements. Haji Jamil was able to exploit the local Hindu population’s departure from the village to buy low cost land and invest in a bore well. This supported a raisin business that started his family’s upward trajectory. However, things improved dramatically 2007 when Jamil’s connections to the family of President Hamid Karzai landed his three sons salaried employment earning a total of around 300,000 Afs per month. This allowed the elderly head to remarry and assured the household’s security, at least for the duration of the Karzai’s rule. By contrast, Yakin (Julan-56) used family and personal ties to secure the credit and capital he needed to start earning income by providing transport services in addition to his work as a sharecropper, after cycling through a range of livelihood activities. Combined with the energy and ambition of Yakin and his wife, these helped them gradually and marginally improve their small family’s fortunes despite a lack of additional male labour.

Skills and education

In two Badakhshan households, it was ability rather than connections that allowed them to secure salaried work. Of the two, Najeeb’s household (Shur Qul-24) achieved the larger positive change. Najeeb’s eldest son’s ability to drive helped him obtain a salaried position as a driver with an international NGO. This supplemented Najeeb’s irregular income from working in the local lapis lazuli mine and small output from the household’s land. The salary lifted the household’s economic fortunes, enabling it to easily afford medical treatment, eat well, and, as the overall creditworthiness of the family increased, borrow enough for the eldest son to marry and repay with confidence. However, the second son is struggling to find a means of contributing. He tried migrating to Iran through smugglers but returned with no income; he then left for Kabul to join the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

Proximity to urban economies

Proximity to Kandahar’s urban informal economy helped two of the Kandahar case households to improve, highlighting the importance of location to livelihood opportunities. Both are from Lalakai village and made use of opportunities in the city to avoid (Hamid, Lalakai-19) or move out of (Shafiq, Lalakai-03) dependent relationships with the village’s main landlord, who wields considerable power to his own advantage. Shafiq’s household improved based on the labour of one worker and his wife’s embroidery, while Hamid, his brothers and his mother diversified into numerous activities catering to the urban market. Hamid’s father died many years ago, but despite being effectively a female-headed family since then the household has experienced slow and steady improvement through access to better quality urban employment as he and his brothers grew up. These opportunities provide only irregular income and come with their own risks, particularly from municipal officials and various forms of informal taxation. The family has been able to go from wearing old clothes, surviving on bread and tea and leaving illness untreated to buying new clothes at Eid, cooking more often and using private doctors. They have also been able to reduce their reliance on credit.

Male workers

The addition of a male worker such as a son coming of age was a critical factor in three other households. While this was a factor in a number of other improving cases, respondents in these three specifically identified the increasing number of workers as central to their households’ improvement. For Abdul Haq’s household (Toghloq-70), male labour and a united joint family enabled agriculture and livestock activities to be its base of growth, the only household for which this was the case. While the family’s fortunes suffered after the ban on opium cultivation, the boost the crop had provided still left them better off than in pre-opium days. It could sharecrop in more land and still send family members to the ailaq (summer pasture) to care for livestock.

41 Shur Qul-24 and Shur Qul-34.

42 Toghloq-70, Lalakai-16 and Julan-48.
In these cases, a combination of luck, hard work and the advantages described above have allowed households to consolidate their positions and lift themselves further out of poverty. In many instances this has left them able to ride out broader economic turbulence and better prepared to cope with the impact of one-off events such as ill-health or marriage. In the case of Muneer (Lalakai-10), the household was able to spend 74,000 Afs on healthcare costs and a 100,000 Afs bride price for a son’s marriage without incurring any significant debt. Lack of or low debt characterises many of the improving households, as the data in Appendix 1 show. However, households with smaller livelihood improvements are in a much more fragile position, and remain exposed to risks that could easily strain household budgets to the point of halting improvement or even tipping them into decline. The households of Shafiq and Yakin are vulnerable due to their dependence on a sole main earner. Both have so far avoided health shocks and their children are too young to marry. However, any event affecting the men’s ability to work or requiring high expenditures could easily move these households into poverty. Although Hamid and his brothers were able to pay for medical treatment for their mother in Pakistan and two marriages, the next brother wonders how the family will afford his marriage. All three of these households still have relatively high levels of debt.

4.2 Stable, coping households

Out of the 64 case study households, six maintained their positions, coping—easily or with some struggle—with the balance of positive and negative events they experienced. There was often little to distinguish these households from those with small improvements like Shafiq’s or Yakin’s; in many cases those without the capacity to improve found themselves bogged down by burdens of health events, social ceremony expenditures and high debt levels.

The first three coping cases (Badakhshan households Shur Qul-38, Toghloq-77 and Khilar-56) were able to cope with health events, drought and debt through the quality of the work their few workers could obtain. Each had at least one member with a salaried job. The salaries may not come regularly but the expectation of the income provided a measure of stability. Two of the three have sold livestock herds to repay debt, pay for marriages or meet other expenses. This illustrates the role of livestock as a stock of savings, sold in times of need. Two have sold land but this seems part of a gradual shift away from agriculture and livestock-based livelihoods, either through work with ANSF or expectations of better-quality work for their children currently in school. For example, the eldest son of Hajji Wadi’s household (Shur Qul-38) is in the internship phase of his medical education. Hajji Wadi’s household is the wealthiest among the six coping cases. Four dry years limiting land production have held it back from any major improvements, as has a lack of market access for recent good apple crops, which were fed to livestock or simply allowed to rot.

The last three cases (Kandahar households Lalakai-01, Lalakai-12 and Julan-50) coped with health costs, debts and social ceremonies in large part through their wealth of male labour and the multiple streams of income this brought. However, limited opportunities coupled with the burden of negative events balanced the improvement potential this offered. Additionally, the dependence of the two cases from Lalakai village on the main landlord for employment and housing limited the options available to them to improve their positions. Two of these households managed marriage costs through entering exchanges, even though these were less preferred. These three cases are more vulnerable to decline than the Badakhshan ones as they have no land of their own and little or no livestock. The two from Lalakai are particularly vulnerable given the landlord’s

43 For details see Appendix 2. In the Badakhshan case study, more households were identified as maintaining or struggling than included here. This is because households which maintained their post-opium cultivation ban positions, which were lower than during opium cultivation, were classified as coping or maintaining. In this paper these households are classified as declining.

44 An exchange marriage occurs when two households swap daughters, each gaining a wife for one of their sons in the process. This generally means that bride prices are low or non-existent, and such marriages are perceived to lead to more conflict because if one daughter is ill-treated there is an expectation that the other should experience the same.
willingness to arbitrarily remove access to land and employment, which in these cases means losing their homes as well as their jobs.

The future potential of the Badakhshan households seems more positive given their investments in education of both boys and girls. However, for the Kandahar households there seems little scope for greater stability let alone improvement in future since few of the younger members have been educated or are studying.

4.3 Declining households

Out of the 64 case households 45 fall into the declining category. These households include three quarters of the Badakhshan households and all 24 of the Sar-i-Pul households. Only three Kandahar households are classified as declining. These numbers and the distribution of households by provincial location are statements in themselves of the challenges rural households have faced since 2002, particularly those in more remote locations. The high number of declining households represents the consequences of commonly-shared risks across the study villages in Badakhshan and Sar-i-Pul, also present in the Faryab villages. These shared risks were from sources well outside the households’ control and included recurrent multi-year drought, the ban on opium poppy cultivation and the effects of rising food prices in 2008. They interacted with each other to varying degrees—the opium cultivation ban affected different villages to different extents, and was outweighed by the influence of drought in Sar-i-Pul and Faryab. However, when combined they all served to create environments of declining opportunities and growing livelihood insecurity.

These risks affected case households across all wealth groups. However, their impact depended on the frequency and combination of events each household experienced against the background of wider decline, and how well it was able to cope with the challenges this created. Household-specific factors such as ill-health, social ceremonies, land and livestock holdings, household size and composition (especially the presence of male labour), involvement in support or patronage networks and quality of employment opportunities all affected how far each household fell in the general descent. The diagram below traces out the complex interactions between the shared risks (rectangles on the left), household-level risks (ovals on the right), and the different effects of and responses to these risks (hexagons) identified across the declining cases from Badakhshan and Sar-i-Pul. Details of each case cannot be provided as in the previous sections because of the numbers involved. This section instead discusses the patterns of events and responses represented in the diagram to illustrate the cumulative and complex nature of rural risk and vulnerability that social protection programmes must address.

Mounting risk exposure

Opium cultivation ban

In the study villages where opium poppy was cultivated, local enforcement of the government-imposed ban led to reductions in income and consumption levels as households shifted out of opium poppy cultivation into other activities. For some this shift led to rising debt. The opium years enabled households to achieve food security but also buy consumer good and improve their quality of life. These benefits were enjoyed by everyone from landowners to sharecroppers and wage-labourers. In an economy newly flush with cash, shopkeeping also flourished. All of this reversed with the ban. While a few Badakhashan study households were able to cope or improve post-ban due to their levels of male labour, initial assets or access to salaried work, the majority fell into decline.

Drought and price increases

Starting in 2006, large parts of northern Afghanistan including the field sites in Badakhshan, Sar-i-Pul and Faryab suffered from a prolonged drought with increasingly severe effects,
Figure 2: Factors leading to declining livelihood security in Badakhshan, Sar-i-Pul and Faryab

Opsium cultivation decline
- Change crops; less income
- Supply of nonfarm labour rises
- Opium cultivation decline

Drought-related crop loss/failure
- Drought-related crop loss/failure
- Fodder prices rise
- Livestock sales
- Price rises
- Help networks weaken
- Fodder prices rise

Opium cultivation decline
- Women’s paid work intensifies
- Wages decline
- Early marriage of daughters
- Ill health/death
- Social ceremony costs

Debt
- Food aid importance rises
- Food quality/quant falls
- Education investment
- Debt

Help networks weaken
- Food aid importance rises
- Food quality/quant falls
- Education investment
- Help networks weaken

Livestock sales
- Livestock sales
- Help networks weaken
- Food quality/quant falls
- Education investment
- Help networks weaken
compounding the impact of the opium ban.46 Crop yields declined year on year—by 2008, respondents from Sar-i-Pul and Faryab reported complete crop failure. Wood collected on common land for sale or fuel became increasingly scarce. Both of these trends forced households to depend increasingly on markets for food and fuel, making the effects of the 2008 rise in prices of staple goods catastrophic for some. Households in poorer wealth groups reported food rationing and cooking less often, often surviving primarily on bread and tea. Most households reported decline in the quality of their diets, eating meat and rice less often. Food aid obtained through food for work or training and school feeding programmes rose in importance for poorer households as the drought continued. Even wealthier households noted how their small land holdings, which barely produced enough to subsist on in good years, made surviving the drought even more difficult. In many cases these had eroded from generation to generation by inheritance divisions. Respondents also lost grain and fruit crops to pests at various points, especially as access to pesticides and other agricultural inputs became increasingly unaffordable. State or NGO distributions of these inputs were variable at best, often oriented to those with better assets (such as irrigated land or oxen) and at times accessed only through patronage links.

Ill-health

All of the case households—improving, coping and declining—faced risks from ill-health, injuries and related costs. However, the difference between a problem and a catastrophe often lay in their ability to respond to them. Even relatively small-scale health events were still difficult for poor families to afford. For Esmatullah’s poor household in Badakhshan (Shur Qul-33) the inability of the male head to work after falling ill from years of mining work led the household into steep decline. In extremely serious cases, health issues could also reverse the fortunes of relatively well-off households: A daughter’s death from leukemia following treatment costing hundreds of thousands of Afs led Najibullah’s wealthier Badakhshan household (Kushlak-45) into economic crisis. Households coping with health costs resorted to borrowing, livestock sales, working more hours or having more members work (sometimes removing children from school to do so), and mortgaging or selling land. For poorer families there was some evidence of forgoing treatment due to prohibitive costs.

Treatment and travel costs are one barrier to care; treatment quality is another. Villagers highlighted two different dimensions here. One is the quality of medical practitioners’ skills and of medicine received, and the other is perceived discrimination and ill-treatment by clinic staff. One woman from the marginal Sar-i-Pul village of Kushlak describes an encounter with a clinic worker in a neighbouring village after being bypassed by an entire queue of patients:

He laughed and said “Bibi jan, they don’t care about people like you!” Therefore I decided to leave the clinic immediately and not come back while that person was still working there. That’s why I don’t go anymore.47

Because of these issues, even some poorer households opted for private care, further increasing their cost burdens.

Household deaths due to illness or injuries were never without feelings of loss. However, in cases where earning members died or were disabled there also were dire consequences for livelihood security.48 For example, Mujeeb’s injury while travelling to trade opium six years ago triggered the decline of his household (Toghloq-65). The death of the male head of Feroza’s household (Pishin-23) four years ago also started its decline. Coupled with the disability of the only adult son and his wife, this means the female head’s earnings doing laundry for others and the daughter-in

46 Faryab respondents reported earlier onset of drought conditions, which started in 2004.

47 See household Kushlak-05.

48 For example, cases Sarband-00, Pishin-23, Pishin-26, Khilar-58, Toghloq-65, Shur Qul-27, Shur Qul-22, Khilar-43, Khilar-49, Julan-46, Julan-58, and Lalakai-00. See the provincial case studies for details.
-law’s earnings from tailoring and teaching a short tailoring course are all that support the family. The son does seasonal brick-making work but cannot produce much because of his disability. He has been jobless in winter during the drought since the slim chance of finding day labour in Sar-i-Pul town is no longer worth the cost of travelling there. Borrowing to pay for a sick grandchild’s healthcare has increased the family’s debt burden further still.

**Social events**

Funerals and marriages are two important opportunities for families to demonstrate their membership of the village community and maintain access to the support networks, patronage relations and other social resources membership offers. Households thus make considerable investments in ceremonies and the acts of charity and faith associated with them. However, the level of expenditure related to them can be debilitating and strategies to fund participation can negatively affect livelihood security. For example, households could spend between 10,000 and 50,000 Afs or more on funerals, while bride prices of 100,000 or 200,000 Afs were not uncommon. Often these social investments led to borrowing or sales of land and livestock, reflecting the value people placed on household reproduction and efforts to avoid the shame of a long engagement. Despite this, households in both Badakhshan and Sar-i-Pul reported delayed marriages and long engagements caused by their inability to raise the necessary funds during the drought. Other Sar-i-Pul households resorted to the less costly but undesirable option of exchange marriages. While bride prices declined compared to the opium years, particularly in Badakhshan, respondents also reported that increasing competition between households was still inflating prices above what many could afford. A few households did make some effort to limit spending on social events out of either principle or necessity. In Badakhshan, Khilar’s village patron, the local commander Qutbuddin, apparently issued a decree to limit spending on marriages and other ceremonial events, but to no effect.

**Coping strategies amid narrowing options**

**Labour diversification and migration**

The effects of drought and the opium cultivation ban decreased the availability of agricultural labour opportunities. The high demand for labour and correspondingly high wages of the opium cultivation period disappeared with the ban since other crops required less work and offered lower returns. Drought only worsened this. The end result was an increase in the number of people seeking nonfarm labour opportunities in an already weak job market. Labour migration, a livelihood strategy with a long history in Afghanistan, grew in importance. Some households in Sar-i-Pul sent men to the brickfields near Mazar-i-Sharif while in Badakhshan a number of young men joined the ANSF as a way to escape the lack of local opportunities. Some men quickly left the ANSF due to the rigors of training, and three households had sons killed or gravely injured. These were personal tragedies as well as economic shocks. In two of these cases, one involving a death and the other a loss of limb and expensive medical treatment, the complex claims process and interference by local powerholders left households without the cushion of a state martyrs’ pension.

International labour migration was one of the most common responses to livelihood decline in Sar-i-Pul and Faryab but was reported to a lesser extent among Badakhshan households. In some cases migration was to Pakistan but more often it was to Iran where opportunities were thought to be better. However, entering Iran was more difficult and left people reliant on smugglers charging upwards of 30,000 Afs to get them across the border. This came with significant risks as the case of Anjamuddin’s household in Sarband-00 shows. The eldest son tried multiple times to enter Iran, either failing entirely or entering only to be deported just after repaying the smuggler’s fee. He has 30,000 Afs debt due to one deportation experience and also reported being held by the Taliban in Nimroz Province.

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49 Shaw, “Evidence from Sar-i-Pul”; Nezami with Kantor, “Evidence from Faryab.”
and forced to work in a heroin processing plant. Similar experiences were not uncommon among other migrants, including being held for ransom by smugglers along the route. The men had to work off the smugglers’ payment before being able to send money home. This led to considerable waiting periods and worry for family members in the villages. Where women were left on their own with children, they relied on extended family members to access markets. These myriad risks did not stop families relying on migration, and some who had once been sceptical were increasingly prepared to accept it as a last resort.

By 2008, the last year of drought, the gap between the supply and demand of nonfarm workers widened, in part due to the added effect of higher staple food prices. The widening gap led to decreasing wages. Some respondent households with males in Iran or Pakistan reported that there were fewer and lower quality work opportunities in both places, making migration less profitable. Similarly, those working in the brickfields experienced a drop in earnings while facing rising costs of food and housing, leaving them with less money left to send home. It was this crunch that most affected Fahima’s household in Badakhshan (Kushlak-51), which had previously been protected from the drought downturn by its cohort of many male workers and livelihood activities, including brick making, that were independent of the land.

Access to male labour

Household size and composition played a role in determining how hard the deprivations of recent years hit households. The age of family members also affected households’ exposure to age-related health risks and marriage pressures. The most important considerations across all households’ ability to cope with the downturn were the amount of male labour and number of dependents. Multiple male workers enabled diversification into different agricultural activities, nonfarm activities, or across both. In many cases the presence of multiple male workers opened up labour migration as an option, before the downturn, as in the case of Fahima’s household, as well as in response to it. Because of the uncertainties involved, only a few households sent their only male adult to migrate.

However, access to male labour is by no means a guaranteed path to livelihood security since the quality and range of options available limit the benefits it brings. Islamuddin’s Sar-i-Pul household (Kushlak-52) demonstrates this with its seven members, including three male workers. It only has rainfed land which has been unproductive for the last four years. Two sons have been engaged in various contract labour arrangements with wealthier villagers or relatives for the past few years. One was dismissed from a contract position due to lack of work and the other recently left his to try to find work in Iran; his employer refused to pay him for the four of six months worked since he did not complete the full period. Islamuddin himself collects and sells firewood. The irregularity, low earnings and dependence characterising the work opportunities available meant the household’s male members were unable to earn an adequate living despite their numbers; this led the household to marry one daughter last year at age 15 to secure a 100,000 Afs bride price. By comparison, in Yakin and Shafiq’s Kandahar households, one worker involved in the urban economy was enough to support small increases in livelihood security.

While access to able-bodied male labour does not guarantee better livelihood opportunities and outcomes, it still provides more choices than available to those respondents without this resource. The case of Abdul Hakim’s Sar-i-Pul household (Pishin-32) illustrates this. Abdul Hakim is older and has two wives, three young daughters still at home, three daughters married and no sons. The family’s lack of male labour has forced it to rely on irreversible and damaging coping methods to survive the drought. Abdul Hakim has already sold land and livestock and will continue to do so to survive, while his three daughters were married early for a total bride price of 570,000 Afs. The household currently survives on the

50 The use of marriage as a means of household survival was not uncommon; Islamuddin mentioned above as well as households Pishin-21, Kushlak-53 and Lalakai-00 reported using this response to cope with economic decline. See the provincial case studies for details.
relations in carpet weaving have shifted in favour of more powerful traders over the last few decades, meaning few still weave independently. Most work for subcontractors for half of a predetermined market price (receiving about US $300 for six months work in the case of qalins). Women reported that the difficult work involved in carpet weaving and the low returns meant that for all but the most poor this was an activity only resorted to in times of economic crisis.

Many women in the Sar-i-Pul households also spun wool for traders. As with nonfarm labour for men, earnings per weight of spun wool declined as the market became saturated with women in urgent need of cash income; as the drought continued, the going rate per pau (half-kilo) dropped from 10 to 7 Afs. In many cases, the pressures of housework and childcare meant women could spin only a pau per day. While this could not provide livelihood stability, it did at least keep the family stocked with soap, tea and children’s school supplies.

Livestock sales

Decreasing land yields led to increasing reliance on livestock sales among landowners, sharecroppers and wage-labourers alike. In early stages of the drought livestock were buffers against consumption reductions, sold to meet food needs, repay debts or meet household costs. Wealthier households could better afford this though some with large numbers of dependents or buffeted by additional crises went into steep decline, selling significant portions of their flocks. Natural increase made livestock sales less irreversible than other responses, but as drought conditions

51 Nezami with Kantor, “Evidence from Faryab.”

52 See Kushlak-56, Sarband-19 and Khilar-58 in the associated case studies.
continued and fodder became less available and more expensive, respondents reported fewer or no births each year. Livestock sales, including of oxen, became more frequent as the cost of keeping animals rose, and most were sold at significant losses. Coupled with crop failures in 2008, this meant many landowners and sharecroppers had no inputs to kick-start cultivation when the rains came in 2009, especially in Sar-i-Pul.

**Education investments**

Section 3 showed that there were differences in access to education facilities across the study villages, with access in Badakhshan generally better than in Sar-i-Pul or Kandahar, except for Khilar village. The better and longer-term access characterising Badakhshan has translated into a greater determination to educate both male and female children. Even among very poor households most if not all children were in school. This is in part due to the presence of food aid, but a number of respondent households from Badakhshan clearly articulated the growing importance of education as a form of future livelihood security. In some cases this was reflected in the presence of role models in the village who used education to gain salaried work. As Qadir, the head of household Shur Qul-36, observed:

> We saw that some people in the village used to have a lot of sheep, but have since lost them all. However, if they were literate, their literacy remained with them. So we realised that education is the best thing.

**Informal credit and charity**

The opium cultivation ban, drought and rising food prices all led to increasing debt burdens for many respondent households. Most families reported buying food on credit from shopkeepers as their reliance on the market increased. In the villages of Sarband and Khilar in Sar-i-Pul and Badakhshan, this credit was given with interest. Accepted measures of household creditworthiness included the size of its livestock herd, and having a son in Iran. Households viewed maintaining creditworthiness and the access to mutual support networks it enabled as key to securing both their basic needs and additional support for health events and social ceremonies. However, some reported losing creditworthiness over the course of the drought as they depleted their land and livestock herds.

Two of the poorest respondent households had few workers and actively avoided borrowing due to their inability to repay. As discussed above, Abdul Hakim’s household survived from land sales and daughters’ marriages, while Najeem’s household in Badakhshan (Shur Qul-27) survived on proceeds from a land sale, food aid and charity. Many households across study villages observed that charitable donations have become smaller and more scarce in recent years, making this a precarious source of support. This decline may be partially due to the drought, since levels reportedly improved with the good rains of 2009. It also might reflect growing concerns for household over collective needs as modernisation processes affect village life.

53 See Kantor and Pain, “Securing Life and Livelihoods.”

**4.4 Conclusion**

Overall, the evidence from the declining households illustrates that the types of household-specific risks they faced—ill-health, deaths, large social expenditures—did not differ from those faced by the improving and coping households. Instead, the overarching effects of the opium ban, drought and rising food prices created an environment which left households little room to manoeuvre in their responses to them. The depth of decline was affected by the extent of reliance on land- and livestock-based activities and access to male labour enabling diversification, compounded to a greater or lesser degree by household-specific events. However, the irregularity and low quality of alternative opportunities, even in Iran and Pakistan, reduced the usefulness of diversification. As Mohammad
Ibrahim of Pishin noted, life became characterised by needing to work harder, eat less and take on more debt.\textsuperscript{54}

This analysis of the various factors driving improvement, decline and stability of rural livelihood security has identified openings where social protection policy and programming could help reduce exposure to and the effects of economic and social sources of risk. These include agricultural variability and viability, diversification and quality of nonfarm employment opportunities, financial services, ill-health and social ceremony expenditures, education, and social assistance and aid delivery. The next section discusses potential for intervention in these areas under a framework of protective, preventive, promotive and transformative forms of social protection.
5. Improving Rural Livelihood Security

This section identifies openings where social protection policy, either independently or channelled through agriculture and rural development (ARD) policy, could assist rural households to achieve greater livelihood security. Based on the case evidence in Section 4, it discusses six areas for intervention, outlining the social and economic risks involved, highlighting the successes and failures of existing attempts to tackle them, and identifying ways forward for policymakers.

5.1 Agricultural variability and viability

Of all 19 improving households, only one was able to achieve their position through an agriculture-based livelihood (i.e. one based on farming, livestock rearing, or off-farm agricultural processing activities). This raises serious questions over the viability of agriculture as a means to escape poverty in its own right. For the large majority of study households, a complex and increasing burden of risks left families finding it harder and harder to make even the most basic of livings from the land.

Land-based risks

Constraints related to land size and ownership concentration limit the viability of agriculture as a means to sustain a living for many people, let alone as a route out of poverty. Inheritance practices that divide and subdivide land and livestock holdings over generations mean land sizes are declining. This trend, coupled with large household sizes, means it is likely to become more difficult to achieve land-based food security in future. In fact under current land ownership conditions only one study household in Badakhshan and six in Sar-i-Pul reported achieving grain self-sufficiency from their land (owned or sharecropped) in a normal agricultural year. Land quality in these mountainous areas as well as lack of irrigation infrastructure compound the challenges of small land size. There is scope here for programme designers and local communities to explore methods of joint cultivation and resource-sharing across such fragmented landholdings. These must develop based on local recognition of their value and not be imposed by external state or non state actors.

The more significant land-based risk in Kandahar, which had largely avoided the effects of drought and the opium ban, was the concentration of landholdings and the power imbalances they produced. With land in the hands of a few wealthier and often predatory landlords, the terms of sharecrop arrangements there were generally unequal and insecure from the perspective of land-poor and landless farmers. In villages such as Khilar in Badakhshan, where there were more landowners offering sharecrop land, this imbalance was less extreme. With more land available to sharecrop, the landless and land-poor had more ability to opt out of unfavourable arrangements in an effort to find a better situation. The improving and coping households from Kandahar’s Lalakai village were classified as such partly because they had avoided or moved out of dependent relationships with the main landlord. Although they were still vulnerable to other risks, they had at least achieved a measure of autonomy. Assisting others to make a similar move could improve their security, but a lasting solution will require a conscious challenge to existing concentrations of power to open more options to all village residents. Encouraging greater organisation among farmers and marginalised groups will play a critical role, but in many cases transformation must also be promoted in consultation with existing elites, to gain their support and buy in.

Shared risks and responses: drought and the poppy cultivation ban

Other sources of risk for those pursuing a livelihood based wholly or in part on agricultural activities come from factors that are out of their hands. Weather conditions like the multi-year drought experienced in the North, the opium poppy

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55 Krishna also identified land division as a factor limiting the potential of agriculture to be a means of moving out of poverty. See Krishna, One Illness Away.
cultivation ban and global food price fluctuations set the scene for a severe downturn in the rural economy. This triggered a complex series of knock-on effects and vicious cycles whose effects will likely be felt long after the initial period of crisis. The prevalence of rainfed lands and lack of irrigation infrastructure made the drought more difficult to cope with for many households.  

Far from a rarity, dry spells are a part of agricultural life in Afghanistan, as the country’s Agriculture and Rural Development Strategy notes. Respondents across the Sar-i-Pul and Badakhshan sites noted how there may have been only three or four good years of production since Karzai came to power. The failure to accompany the ban with any coherent attempt to cushion its effects on the local economy has led to considerable disaffection with the government. So too has the perceived failure of state and aid actors in delivering promised aid once provinces were able to demonstrate their “poppy-free” status. In addition to undermining government legitimacy, this approach risks a return to opium poppy cultivation as soon as the terms of trade between wheat and poppy shift in favour of the latter.

Driven by politics, the ban on opium cultivation decimated village and household economies as the Badakhshan case study vividly illustrated. The failure to accompany the ban with any coherent attempt to cushion its effects on the local economy has led to considerable disaffection with the government. So too has the perceived failure of state and aid actors in delivering promised aid once provinces were able to demonstrate their “poppy-free” status. In addition to undermining government legitimacy, this approach risks a return to opium poppy cultivation as soon as the terms of trade between wheat and poppy shift in favour of the latter.

### Limits to input delivery and accessibility

Plant diseases, pests and livestock diseases were other sources of crop or livestock loss affecting respondent households, including those in the improving and coping categories. Lack of or unreliable access to agricultural inputs including veterinary care made these risks real for many households. Some respondents reported that they received improved seeds or fertiliser from the state or NGOs. However, their distribution tended to be in less than needed quantities, unsuitable for local conditions (e.g. fertiliser requiring high water use), and uncoordinated such that inputs generally were not delivered together. Case evidence also showed that input distribution could be hijacked by local patronage networks. Availability of inputs therefore did not mean they were equally accessible to all who qualified. In addition, input distribution often did not consider the needs of those most at risk of food insecurity—small-scale farmers of rainfed land without draught animals. In general, state or NGO provision of inputs was limited and, particularly in the North as the drought continued and prices rose, many farmers were unable to afford to purchase them in the market. Once the drought ceased in 2009, the resulting dearth of seeds and oxen left households in a weak position to recover. Improving input delivery is an important strategy to promote improved livelihood outcomes, but any efforts to do so also must find ways to prevent access from being distorted along the fault lines of village power structures. If input delivery programmes are to be pro-poor, they must address the needs of the people they target, with a focus on affordability, use on

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56 A study conducted by Altai Consulting for the World Bank identified lack of irrigation water as a constraint to the potential for households to escape poverty through agriculture. See Altai Consulting, “Moving out of Poverty.”


58 Pain, “Evidence from Badakhshan”

59 For more on the opium poppy issue see David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Opium Poppy Eradication: How to Raise Risk When There Is Nothing to Lose?” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006); David Mansfield and Adam Pain, “Evidence from the Field: Understanding Changing Levels of Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2006).

60 Altai Consulting, “Moving out of Poverty” identified lack of access to seeds and fertiliser as another constraint to the potential for households to escape poverty through agriculture. See also Christoplos, “Out of Step?”

current ARD strategy is on improving production for markets and supporting market development. This transition may require substituting market for subsistence production, implying an increased reliance on the market for people’s basic food needs. The findings of this study and other AREU research suggest that many are unlikely to welcome this shift due to a deep-seated mistrust of the market as it currently operates. In fact, securing wheat access after the 2008 food price rise was identified as one reason why farmers planted wheat instead of opium poppy on newly-cultivated lands in Helmand in 2009. Food security is thus a strong motivator.

Agriculture policy must acknowledge that farmers have different interests and willingness to risk market engagement. Therefore, agriculture development strategies must do more to meet the needs of both market producers and subsistence farmers. For the latter, policies must first reduce perceived risks to food security, through improving the productivity of staple crops or providing crop insurance that protects against the effects of crop loss. The resulting increased security may then improve the willingness of subsistence farming households to take up new market-oriented opportunities, as suited to local conditions.

Approaches to improve agricultural viability

Table 2 provides a summary of policy approaches which can assist in improving the viability of agricultural activities. Divided into the four categories of social protection discussed in Section 2, they include: developing and testing insurance products to help protect against crop loss (see section 5.3); improving the coordinated delivery of inputs in ways accessible to a wide range of farmers; focusing on labour intensity of productivity

Senior Roe, “Water, Opium and Livestock: Resources Management, Farming Systems and Rural Livelihoods” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008); Lorene Flaming and Alan Roe, “Opportunities for Pro-Poor Agricultural Growth” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2009).

Respondents’ concerns about market interaction were most extreme when it came to purchasing food to meet production shortfalls. Coupled with other constraints, the fear of relying on the market for basic food requirements means many farm households prioritise subsistence production.

Data from the Government of Afghanistan’s National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) for 2007/08 support this. It found that 44 percent of rural Afghans report agriculture as a primary income source and 54 percent of these households farm for household consumption. This raises questions about the focus of agriculture policy in the country. While noting the need to assure food security, a primary focus of the government’s

Market risks

An increasing need to engage in markets caused many respondents considerable strain. The few large raisin producers among Kandahar respondents had sufficient connections and market power to negotiate favourable terms. Most were not so fortunate. For example, in Badakhshan remoteness and poor transport links meant there was no way to sell a surplus in apple production. Unlike the case of opium sales, the market no longer came to the farm. Drought-driven livestock price fluctuations, driven by mass distress sales, led many to despair at ever recovering lost herds. Sales occurred when markets were flooded and livestock were underweight due to lack of fodder; in 2009 when rains improved prices bounced back to pre-drought levels, leaving households with finances decimated by recent shocks unable to reinvest. Many respondents felt consistently disadvantaged in market transactions.

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improvements to avoid large employment losses through mechanisation; and exploring successful means of collective organisation for farmers, sharecroppers and agricultural labourers to improve their bargaining power. The government and NGOs all have a role in delivering these interventions, but they must also be supported by donors aware of the need to place risk reduction front and centre in efforts to maximise agriculture’s contribution to Afghanistan’s development.

### 5.2 Limits of diversification into nonfarm employment

While agriculture is a risky livelihood strategy given climatic conditions, weak infrastructure and input provision, and inequalities in resource access, nonfarm employment does not provide a significantly better option for the majority. While most improving and coping households have reduced their dependence on agriculture by diversifying into nonfarm employment, a similar strategy failed to work for many declining households. The limited quantity and quality of employment opportunities available to respondent households in the drought affected areas constrained the potential of nonfarm employment to be a way out of poverty. Remoteness compounds these conditions. Distance, lack of resources, poor access to markets and powerlessness associated with poverty mean that the basis for a strong nonfarm economy is limited at best in remote areas. In such cases interventions aimed at improving people’s capacity to diversify may bring little in the way of tangible improvements, as Esmatullah’s wife (household Shur Qul-33) notes:

> I knit socks and gloves for people. They provide the thread and I knit but they don’t pay me a wage. I can’t say anything because they themselves have no feelings. Skills in such remote areas can never be helpful...It is difficult to use one’s skills in areas far away from main cities, where people don’t have jobs except owning a little land and some livestock.

These concerns are borne out by 2007/08 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA), which suggests a general failure of nonfarm diversification to lift rural households out of poverty across Afghanistan (Table 3).

Rural households are highly diversified, reporting on average 2.3 different income sources compared to 1.4

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**Table 2: Policy options to reduce risks associated with agricultural output variability**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Social protection orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test options for insurance products protecting against crop loss, market variability: orient to needs of both subsistence and market producers</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve outreach and inclusiveness of programmes delivering agriculture inputs: accessible to poorer farmers and sharecroppers; orient to subsistence producer needs; suit needs of rainfed and irrigated land cultivators; deliver complementary inputs together</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore conditions where informal asset sharing (draught power) can be formalised to improve security of access</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritise labour-intensive means of enhancing agriculture productivity</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore existing or new opportunities to promote joint production of small plots</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test the potential for collective organisations to improve bargaining power, market positions of sharecroppers, agricultural workers</td>
<td>Promote; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For market producers, identify conditions under which associations can lead to better market access and market power</td>
<td>Promote; transform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
for urban households.\textsuperscript{67} Households reporting farming for market or domestic consumption or transfers\textsuperscript{68} as primary income sources had higher than average numbers of activities.\textsuperscript{69} However, diversification does not guarantee livelihood security. Across all main income sources except trade, craft and transport, rural households with more economic activities had higher average poverty head count rates. This shows that poverty necessitates diversification. The poor quality of nonfarm employment is clear from the poverty data in Table 3. Households reporting nonfarm labour as their primary income source had the second highest rural poverty incidence. The inability of rural nonfarm labour to deliver improved livelihood security to more Afghans is linked to the conditions under which it occurs. Therefore, while the World Bank and others recommend a strategy of mixed portfolios of farming and nonfarm labour activities, including migration, in order to increase income and define a “pathway out of poverty,”\textsuperscript{70} evidence from this study, supported by 2007/08 NRVA data, demonstrates that diversification under existing conditions in rural Afghanistan does not provide a way out of poverty.\textsuperscript{71}

### Distress diversification

For the rural nonfarm economy to provide opportunities that reduce poverty, there needs to be an engine of growth to support it and the opportunities it presents must be accessible to the poor.\textsuperscript{72} When the agricultural economy is dynamic and incomes are rising, agriculture can provide the basis for growth in the nonfarm economy, boosting the demand for services, transport and (where they are competitive with imports) manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{73} Badakhshan during the opium boom is a strong example of this process. However, the conditions in Badakhshan and Sar-i-Pul after the cultivation ban and during the drought demonstrate the limits of the rural nonfarm economy when demand for goods and services is low and wages are declining. These factors, along with population growth and smaller landholdings, drove households to seek nonfarm

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
Main income source & Average no. of income sources & Household poverty rates \\
\hline
Subsistence farming & 2.5 & 34.7 \\
Market farming & 2.5 & 28.4 \\
Agriculture wage labour & 2.1 & 36.8 \\
Nonfarm wage labour & 2.0 & 38.3 \\
Trade, craft, transport & 2.1 & 28.7 \\
Transfers & 2.8 & 42.4 \\
Other & 2.0 & \\
Total & 2.3 & 35.8 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Diversification and poverty rates by main income source}
\end{table}

Source: GoA, NRVA 2007/08

\textsuperscript{67} GoA, Poverty Status.

\textsuperscript{68} Transfers include remittances, pensions, government benefits, rental income, sale of food aid, begging and borrowing.

\textsuperscript{69} GoA, Poverty Status.

\textsuperscript{70} World Bank, \textit{Agriculture for Development} (Washington DC: World Bank, 2007); Cook, “Structural Change.”

\textsuperscript{71} GoA, Poverty Status.


\textsuperscript{73} Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon, “Rural Non-farm Economy.”
employment for lack of alternative options.\textsuperscript{74} This is distress-based diversification, which is more likely to be precarious and exploitative than diversification motivated by new opportunities to prosper.\textsuperscript{75}

It is this kind of diversification that characterises the declining study households. This is evident in the generally low-skilled and low-paid types of work people resorted to, such as day labour, making bricks, loading trucks, collecting and selling firewood, or spinning wool. Workers were prepared to take higher risks or submit themselves to dependent relations to secure a source of income. Such jobs regularly featured exploitative arrangements favouring employers, who held the keys to desperately-needed work in an already saturated employment market. Lack of skills or connections and gender norms further limited choices. This scenario was seen across agriculture wage work and sharecropping as well as nonfarm wage work, among Kandahar’s powerless sharecroppers, in the terms of work for female carpet-weavers, and in the widespread dependence on labour contractors and people smugglers across villages in the North.

**Limited options: female labour**

Women’s contribution to household livelihoods in Sar-i-Pul and Faryab increased in importance during the economic decline. However, gender norms defining the types and places of work acceptable for women limited how far women’s economic activities could contribute to diversification strategies.

The urban informal economy provided a valuable employment avenue for some Kandahari case households. However, the gains were small and they that did not set the families on secure upward trajectories.\textsuperscript{76} Instead, irregularity of work, low returns, lack of capital, uncertain access to space to vend, and potential for exploitation by officials constrained their efforts. These characteristics of urban opportunities call for efforts to develop urban services and decent employment opportunities in the urban informal economy.\textsuperscript{77} Similarly, the case evidence shows that conditions in neighbouring countries are worsening economically and politically, and that the risks of entering Iran in particular are high. International labour migration was less often a means of improving livelihood security than of coping or survival, demonstrating the need to regulate international labour migration and protect migrants. These barriers highlight the need to extend the horizons of rural development efforts to areas well beyond the village. Improving the quality of urban jobs and services and poor people’s readiness for them, as well as working to protect and formalise the rights of international migrants may in many cases do more to strengthen rural livelihoods than efforts to develop the rural economy in marginal agro-ecological areas.

Women’s contribution to household livelihoods in Sar-i-Pul and Faryab increased in importance during the economic decline. However, gender norms defining the types and places of work acceptable for women limited how far women’s economic activities could contribute to diversification strategies.

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74 Haggbalde, Hazell and Reardon, “Rural Non-farm Economy.”

75 Kay, “Development Strategies.”

76 Krishna found the same in his multi-country study *One Illness Away*; the urban informal economy supported small improvements.

increasing pressures of economic need may be expanding the space for change, as the female head of Sarband-00 notes:

The mullah also said on the loudspeaker not to let women go out of their homes or to the city... But the people didn’t accept this. If the mullah would bring food, clothes for my child, sugar and everything we need, because now my husband is not with me, then I would accept his idea! The mullah’s stomach is full, so he doesn’t know about the people’s problems.

Policy approaches to improve diversification options

The evidence on the limits of diversification as a means to improve livelihood security and reduce poverty highlight the need for policymakers to give attention not just to creating more jobs but also better quality jobs. They also need to develop coordinated strategies including education and skills development to enable the poor, who are more likely to diversify out of agriculture on the least positive terms, to benefit. Programmes seeking to promote rural enterprise development need to recognise that existing conditions may not always be able to support a growth-oriented rural off-farm and nonfarm sector that can benefit the poor. In more remote regions, this may require a shift in strategy to promoting more viable labour migration options. In others, more work must be done to provide households with stable incomes and freedom from uncertainty before targeting growth-oriented strategies that offer better returns at higher risk. For women and the landless, there must also be a greater focus on overcoming social constraints on access to resources or markets.

Table 4 provides a range of interventions geared toward improving the quality of opportunities

78 Kabeer, “Safety Nets.”


80 Haggblade, Hazell and Reardon, “Rural Non-farm Economy.”
outside of farming. Those focused on community-level actions are most appropriate for civil society leadership. For the government, priorities should include improving the pace and quality of economic infrastructure investments, enacting legislative changes on workers’ rights, setting quality standards for national programmes, envisioning and implementing a joint rural-urban development strategy and protecting Afghans seeking work abroad.

5.3 Financial services

Backed up by previous AREU research, the cases here demonstrate that most households had access to credit from informal sources like family, neighbours and shopkeepers. For example, average debt levels for the Sar-i-Pul households were 45,000 Afghans or US $900. Some were able to access very high levels for investments but most often these amounts were for marriages or severe health events. Others avoided debt because they were wealthy enough to do so or because they knew their economic position did not enable them to repay. But for many households in the drought-hit areas, credit increasingly became a way of life.

Credit risks

While credit was available and clearly important to tiding households over either in times of crisis or in response to the normal seasonal variations of rural life, it did not appear to be a means of reducing risk. It was not clear that the returns of farm and nonfarm rural economic activities were high enough to support repayment of cost-free informal credit, let alone microcredit with fees. For households in decline or struggling to cope, credit may not be the correct instrument to support poverty reduction and may end up increasing vulnerability as repayment absorbs funds that could be used for agricultural inputs, education or other investments.

Gaps in access: savings and insurance products

The case evidence demonstrates a clear need for financial services that can improve rural households’ ability to manage risk. This means making access to savings and insurance products a priority over extending credit coverage. This gap is recognised in the government’s social protection sector strategy, which recommends developing community-based savings schemes and insurance to cushion against failing harvests. However, these recommendations remain just that.

To date, priorities of existing microfinance institutions and regulatory bodies are skewed overwhelmingly in favour of credit. Microcredit offered through the Microfinance Investment Support Facility of Afghanistan (MISFA) has focused on promoting growth through access to credit for productive purposes. It has also largely focused on urban and periurban locations. It is currently expanding into rural areas and developing loan products suited to rural livelihood activities, and its main priority is to strengthen microcredit delivery practices with the aim of achieving sustainability. While valuable for urban clients, this approach may not be what rural residents most need. The Afghan National Development Strategy’s proposed rural credit facility (the Afghan Development Fund) tells a similar story, making no mention of even exploring pilot attempts to deliver alternative financial services to rural households. MISFA did investigate demand for savings among clients and the preparedness of existing microfinance institutions (MFIs) to take on the challenge of expanding into a wider range of financial services, but found that numerous obstacles

81 Floortje Klijn and Adam Pain, “Finding the Money” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2007); Kantor, “From Access to Impact.”


83 Christoplos, Out of Step?; Kabeer, “Safety Nets.”


85 Government of Afghanistan (GoA), Social Protection Sector Strategy (Kabul: GoA, 2008).

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It seems to be a case of the needs of the sector and its actors outweighing those of rural clients. In the current climate, more needs to be done to raise awareness of the benefits of savings and insurance, adjust the regulatory environment and improve MFI capacity to move the rural financial services sector beyond credit.

**Approaches to improve risk reduction orientation of financial services**

Acting on the social protection sector strategy’s recommendations to expand existing financial services to include savings and crop insurance products is important to improving rural livelihood security. However, designing and delivering agricultural insurance programmes will not be easy, as experience elsewhere has shown. The programmes need to be structured to ensure that subsistence farmers as well as more market-oriented producers have access to protection should their crops fail. They also need to cover losses on both farmer-owned and sharecropped land, with protection for the cultivator as well as the landowner in the case of the latter. Any such programme will also need to review existing global practices to establish the best fit for Afghanistan’s institutional, social and economic contexts. Donors have a particularly strong opportunity to push for the development of a more diverse set of microfinance tools, both by specific targeting of funds and advocacy with Afghan government counterparts.

### 5.4 Ill-health and social ceremonies

The burdens of health spending and social ceremony investments are widely recognised as having the potential to make or keep households poor, particularly in South Asia. The case households were no different. Both categories of spending are essential to livelihoods in different ways and cannot or ideally should not be avoided. The central challenges are reducing risks of disease, improving the quality and affordability of healthcare, and managing levels of spending on social events.

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87 MISFA, “Assessing the Demand for Savings Services among Microfinance Clients in Afghanistan” (Kabul: MISFA, 2009); Personal communication, MISFA staff, 18 Oct 2010.


89 Poulton, Dorward and Kydd, “Services, Institutions and Intermediation.”

90 Holmes, Farrington and Slater, “Social Protection and Growth.”

**Risks related to ill-health**

The case evidence across declining, coping and improving households demonstrated the high incidence of health events ranging from chronic illnesses, through pregnancy and child birth complications, along with smaller non-chronic complaints. Provision of clean drinking water in a few of the study villages reduced some of these less serious illnesses, illustrating the importance of improved basic services. However, health expenditures caused considerable strain on households across wealth groups, hitting the poor the hardest. Major health crises often led to high debts and asset sales, and in a few cases families did not seek care because they could not afford it or the associated travel costs. The ill health of a male worker in particular drove a number of households into poverty or ensured that they stayed poor. Healthcare costs were sometimes higher than necessary because concerns about the quality of government-run treatment led households to use private facilities. Overall, the cost of healthcare is a major source of vulnerability to poverty that is not being adequately addressed.

The Ministry of Public Health acknowledges these burdens, as well as barriers to care-seeking related to distance and travel costs. However its health and nutrition strategy does not include specific goals directly related to reducing healthcare costs. Even without goals that provide accountability for progress, it has abolished fees for use of government clinics offering its Basic Package of Health Services. It has also supported a pilot of a community-based health financing scheme to test a health insurance model. While the considerable levels of spending on healthcare identified in a ministry survey and this study seem to indicate premium-based community insurance could work, the fund had only modest results. Enrolment was low due to lack of programme awareness, perceived poor service quality and high premium levels. More experimenting is needed to identify ways to prevent ill-health events—and especially major medical crises—from increasing livelihood insecurity.95

**Risks related to social investments**

It would be easy to label spending on events such as funerals, births or marriages as simple consumption costs. However, this would miss the events’ significance as opportunities to demonstrate membership the village community, and thus invest in the social relationships which play such an important role in defining livelihood security.96 The policy opening is not about eliminating these expenditures but about identifying ways to manage spending levels in a way that reduces their potential to trigger rising debt, asset sales or other negative response strategies.

For marriages this means reducing both bride prices and spending on the ceremony itself. These efforts should make marriage more affordable, reducing marriage delays, and reduce the incidence of marrying young daughters for bride price due to economic need. While the study evidence contained isolated examples of attempts to reduce marriage costs, lasting change will require a widespread consensus to counter the pressures of competition, conformity and pride that push spending higher. One potentially effective strategy is to relate community custom back to Islamic practice, which prohibits high bride prices. In one village in Ghazni Province, elders reportedly set an upper limit for bride price of 150,000 Afs, which was accepted and appreciated since it enabled more young people to marry.97

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95 Rao et al, “Community Health Funds.”


The Council of Religious Scholars welcomed this and there were requests to apply it throughout the province. Another example comes from Balkh where an NGO is using public outreach campaigns to promote the idea of group marriages to reduce wedding costs, though this is more acceptable to Shias than Sunnis. While research has identified a general openness to a change in marriage practices in many areas, the pace of change must ultimately be one that is acceptable to the local community; for this reason efforts driven by local actors working in dialogue with communities are likely to be more successful than impositions from above that could be perceived as foreign-imposed.

Funeral ceremonies and related charity requirements are another set of important rituals. However they too can raise vulnerability to poverty, meaning that cooperative efforts to keep these costs down form another important preventative social protection approach. One example from the case data presents a possible way forward. In Khilar village in Badakhshan there has been a custom in place for the last seven years that when someone dies, villagers buy the required items from local shopkeepers and split the costs of paying for them. This village was also the only one with systematised charitable giving whereby all households gave a portion of grain to the NSP head who created a grain bank for use by those in need.

**Approaches to reducing expenditures on health and social events**

Helping households to afford and manage spending on healthcare and social events can have a major positive impact on rural development, highlighting the need for a broader approach to the issue which takes social protection into greater account. Domestic risks and responses to them can divert precious capital, credit and resources away from productive or subsistence activities. If households had other means to cover these costs or the costs were lower, their assets could be protected. Table 6 identifies a range of options

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98 Zamir, “Frustrated Singles.”


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Table 6: Policy options to reduce risks from ill-health and social spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Social protection orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ill-health</td>
<td>Improve accessibility of healthcare: distance, health costs, transport costs/ambulance services, gender norms</td>
<td>Promote; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve healthcare quality</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve accessibility of basic services like drinking water and sanitation: distance, quality, costs</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Continue testing health insurance options</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Make managing healthcare costs part of core aims of Ministry of Public Health</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social spending</td>
<td>Facilitate locally-led social movements to advocate for limits to spending levels</td>
<td>Prevent; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public awareness campaigns to raise awareness of alternatives, role model villages</td>
<td>Prevent; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify and promote models of collective funding</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It would be easy to label spending on events such as funerals, births or marriages as simple consumption costs. However, this would miss the events’ significance as opportunities to demonstrate membership of the village community, and thus invest in the social relationships which play such an important role in defining livelihood security.

for reducing health and social spending. The state should lead on most of the interventions to manage healthcare costs, in partnership with NGOs active in the sector. Efforts geared to managing social expenditures need to be more locally-driven, and civil society groups are better positioned to engage in this area.

5.5 Education

Investment in education and skills training has the potential to be a promotive social protection mechanism, unlocking new opportunities to help people secure and improve their livelihoods. However, several contextual issues influence how far interventions can realise this potential.

Constraints of patronage

Skills and education can only improve people’s livelihoods if they make a meaningful difference to the choices available to them. Where patronage and connections are the most important factors in landing a job, the usefulness of education is limited. The role of connections varied across study locations. In the deeply entrenched political and kinship networks of Kandahar, securing employment often depended on who you were and who you knew. In more remote Badakhshan, skills such as the ability to drive played a more prominent role. The near-universal relevance of patronage in Afghanistan means connections will continue to be useful, but this is increasingly balanced by a need for skills and education in many areas.

 Constraints of quality

Another factor influencing the promotive potential of education is quality. If the education system cannot teach basic literacy and numeracy as a bare minimum, then its ability to improve students’ livelihood security is limited. A number of shortfalls were evident across the study areas: Children in fourth class were sometimes unable to read and removed from school to work, while teachers were often absent from class or (especially in the case of female teachers) unqualified. These represent the many challenges of ramping up education services after decades of conflict. School enrolment numbers are an inadequate measure of success. The sector needs to devote more resources to making sure that children leave school with the tools they need to improve their futures.

Constraints of gender

Gender norms often present a major social obstacle to education’s potential to improve lives. In a number of study sites girls were unable to attend school due to lack of facilities and conservative gender norms; in the other locations they were able to participate, only to be withdrawn from school at about seventh or eighth class due to concerns about protecting family honour and reputation. These attitudes limit what these girls can be and do in the future, impacting in turn the well-being of their households and ultimately the country. The same is true for boys withdrawn early and put to work. Who knows what these children could aspire to and achieve if given the full scope to learn and dream that a quality education can provide? Interventions like food for schooling programmes did seem to encourage poor families to enrol and keep children in school, most notably in the Badakhshan villages. These programmes thus have valuable protective and promotive potential through supporting food security and providing greater access to schooling.
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Table 7: Policy options to enhance the education sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Social protection orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continue food for schooling programmes to enable enrolment</td>
<td>Protect; promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen efforts to improve the quality of education</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote girls’ access to education: public service campaigns, local influencers, role models</td>
<td>Promote; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broader use of role models to motivate education enrolment and youth aspirations</td>
<td>Promote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address social risks via social justice-oriented curricula</td>
<td>Transform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approaches to improving education access and outcomes

Table 7 identifies ways to invest in education to improve its ability to both promote livelihood security and drive social change. Improving quality and curriculum content is a task for the government in partnership with key donors in the sector. Expanding and enhancing food for schooling links the government with UN agencies and other donors providing these programmes. NGOs, civil society and the state all can engage around promoting girls’ access to education and improving its acceptability beyond current limits, as well as finding new ways to use role models to increase enrolment.

5.6 Social assistance and aid delivery

The household case data showed that various forms of social assistance were available in the villages. Some were state-based, others from NGOs and still others community-based. However the continued tendency of many families to ration food, forego health treatment and marry daughters early to secure bride prices all illustrate the limits of these mechanisms. These more negative survival strategies were more common among families without able-bodied male labour, highlighting the particularly precarious position of these families.

Informal assistance

Some of the informal mechanisms available in different study villages included receiving charity through zakat and ushr, and participation in food distribution through khairat and at weddings and funerals (all specific types of Islamic charity; for definitions see glossary). Charitable giving was highly individualised and variable in all but Khilar with its grain bank system. This lack of institutionalisation placed pressure on recipients to demonstrate their continued “worthiness,” creating a cycle of dependency that sometimes blocked off potential avenues for improvement. Already precarious, this position worsened as charitable giving declined in drought-hit areas.

Non-state assistance

For many respondents, public works projects offering cash or food were the most significant forms of non-state social assistance. All study villages were home to at least one food- or cash-for-work programme. These were often administered by the NSP CDC, which was in charge of picking labourers and distributing food. In general such programmes were open to all villagers, with better-off households just as likely to take part as poorer ones. Many poorer respondent households secured several months’ food supply through a combination of food-for-work, food-for-schooling or food-for-training programmes. However, the short-term and ad hoc nature of work-based

102 The case studies provided considerable evidence of opportunities to obtain food through attending weddings and other events or through khairat. However, the numbers participating and who had access were not investigated, along with whether specific efforts were made to reach the poor or not.

103 Kantor and Pain, “Securing Life and Livelihoods.”
programmes seemed to limit their protective potential. Making them longer term, like the school and course-based programmes, with guaranteed work days per year for poor families could improve their role in stabilising livelihoods. However, it is also important to note that households without male labour tended to be excluded from work-based programmes, or are forced to send children in order to participate. Some NGOs counter this problem by providing vouchers to families unable to take part for this reason.

State assistance

In most study villages, there was little evidence of state social protection interventions. Only a few respondent households had access to the state’s non means-tested pension programme for families of martyrs and disabled. They managed to access this resource through the intervention of a community leader or commander. Though eligible, others without such links have been unable to benefit. This highlights challenges of delivering such benefit programmes at a local level: access often ends up being limited by opaque application processes that depend more on connections than procedure, while many potential recipients may be unaware of their eligibility in the first place.

An awareness of these issues, as well as of the importance of accountability and transparency mechanisms, will need to inform a new pilot cash transfer system. Under this plan, the state will provide unconditional cash transfers via the CDC to each village’s poorest households in an attempt to smooth seasonal consumption variations. This was developed due in part to the recognition that work-based programmes exclude many vulnerable households. To successfully reach those in need and reduce potential for elite capture, the programme will need to be accompanied by enough outreach to ensure that those who stand to benefit from it are aware of its existence and understand how it works so as to hold those administering it accountable for their inclusion and the correct distribution of the cash. The programme provides openings for appeals from those considering themselves unjustly excluded. However, the key will be making sure these hearings are carried out and that people are aware of their right to claim the benefit and feel able to speak out against local leaders who may work the system to their own benefit.

Aid capture by local elites

In many instances, capture or co-opting of aid assistance by village elites—at times acting through NSP CDCs—severely impeded the ability of aid to help the most vulnerable households. This raises important questions of how aid actors engage with villages and the role of CDCs in distributing aid. Many poor respondents in the Kandahar and Sar-i-Pul study sites complained bitterly that the tendency among outside aid actors to limit their interactions to the CDC or other elders effectively shut out the views and needs of poorer residents. Others, including one member of the CDC from Lalakai village, also complained about CDC members distributing the benefits of aid along patronage networks, or simply capturing it for themselves. This might be CDC funds, food aid or access to work days. Where connections were needed to access aid, this led to environments of competition and mistrust.

These local inequalities and hierarchies support the need to question how aid is delivered, and by what means. Programming at a village level enters a complex web of social structures and power relations and can in many cases end up as a tool for strengthening existing inequalities. In particular, an assumption that community bodies must be the most impartial because they are closest to “the people” may be leading to an over-reliance on systems that are in reality little more than proxies for the rich and powerful. All of this can affect programme

104 Holmes, Farrington and Slater, “Social Protection and Growth.”
105 Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), “Pilot Program to Support Poor Families in Afghanistan” (Kabul: MoLSAMD, 2010).
106 MoLSAMD, “Pilot Program.”
107 See Kantor and Pain, “Securing Life and Livelihoods” for more detailed analysis of the role of social relationships and inequalities in Afghan village life.
108 For more detailed analysis of the implications for programming
above are important steps forward, but they must be financially sustainable and accountable and transparent so recipients can depend on them.

5.7 Conclusion

This section identified openings where social protection policy, independently or incorporated into wider development efforts, could improve rural livelihood security. Areas for intervention cover a wide range of issues and sectors, mirroring the complexity of factors influencing livelihood security for rural Afghans. Prioritising among the sectors and policy options is difficult as many intersect and support each other in their effects, or meet the needs of different groups. In all cases, the challenge to fostering sustainable improvements in livelihood security lies in designing interventions that meet immediate needs for protection, prevention and promotion, while fostering social change driven by communities themselves. To achieve this, the reduction of both economic and social risk must form the keystone of future programming and policymaking.

Table 8: Policy options to enhance social assistance and aid delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy area</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Social protection orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social assistance</td>
<td>Regularise and expand work days available through food-for-work; improve means testing</td>
<td>Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure all forms of social assistance reach households lacking able bodied male labour</td>
<td>Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalise traditional forms of giving to make receipt less individualised; orient forms of charity to development; reduce long term dependence when possible</td>
<td>Protect; promote; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure NGO or state social assistance has well-advertised, transparent inclusion criteria and is easy to understand to reduce dependence on others for access</td>
<td>Protect; transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid delivery</td>
<td>Invest the required time to work with the poor or marginalised to create conditions for social change; make interventions socially transformative in delivery mechanisms</td>
<td>Transform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop ways to engage elites to reduce programme co-option; deconcentrate power</td>
<td>Transform</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approaches to improve social assistance and the transparency of aid delivery

As the policy options in Table 8 show, social assistance programmes must adapt to incorporate pre-existing support systems, better target those most in need, and counter local hierarchies which can skew aid distribution along power and patronage lines. All are complex requirements which depend on improving understanding of local contexts, a shift that will need allocations of both time and money. The state and NGOs also need to ensure programme criteria and procedures are as simple and transparent as possible and that information is made readily available through a range of media. Investments in new social assistance programmes like the pilot described

of village context see Pain and Kantor, “Understanding and Addressing Context.”
Despite tangible improvements in many basic services, a culmination of increasing pressures and narrowing options is undermining the ability of many rural families to make a basic living. Across wealth groups, the majority of households in this study experienced declining livelihood security due to the complex interaction of shared risks related to weather, politics and the global economy with individual risks such as ill-health, household composition and life cycle position. For many, factors of location, gender norms, social expectations, and the terms of access to employment limited the range or quality of responses available. In contrast to this, the few households with connections to powerful political actors were able to use these to enhance their wealth and social positions.

The paper identified a wide range of openings for policy and different measures within these. In doing so, it applied the concept of transformative social protection to highlight ways to protect people’s basic needs, prevent deprivation, promote improvement and transform the social structures and expectations that bar their path out of poverty. In this way the recommendations aim to tackle the complex of economic and social causes of poverty as well as treating its symptoms. They also aim to reduce households’ exposure to risk, something current ARD policy approaches do not always seem to prioritise. Instead, these are driven by market-led growth models which overlook the rational aversion to risk that many poor households may feel. A major challenge in moving a poverty reduction and social protection agenda forward in Afghanistan is thus overcoming the privileged position of the market in policy discourse to carve out an equal space for interventions that mitigate risks and stabilise livelihoods.

The aid community—from donors to government and non-government actors—has so far made little progress in its willingness and ability to articulate and act on the risks facing rural Afghans. Part of this shortcoming emanates from the difficulty of targeting the underlying causes of inequality without an understanding of the social dynamics that drive them. There is currently little acknowledgment on the part of either the government or the international community that social context matters, a fact reflected in the limited resources devoted to social analysis in existing policy or programming. This means that the attention given to poverty reduction tends to focus on technically-oriented efforts to deliver access without reflection on how local social environments may limit or distort them. This technical approach risks delivering development programmes that reinforce existing inequalities and feed into grievances related to the distribution of aid.

The scale and scope of policy options identified in Section 5 presents a significant challenge. It is clear that no one agency can address all of these issues, and that many actions depend on others happening in sequence. For example, motivating school enrolment through role models and enhancing aspirations must come hand in hand with better education and an economic environment that allows new skills to be put to use. This technical approach risks delivering development programmes that reinforce existing inequalities and feed into grievances related to the distribution of aid.

The aid community—from donors to government and non-government actors—has so far made little progress in its willingness and ability to articulate

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109 See Christoplos, “Out of Step?” which noted the lack of attention among aid actors to rural risks and the lack of understanding of the sources of vulnerability rural Afghans faced as early as 2004.

110 Christoplos, “Out of Step?”

111 Kantor and Pain, “Poverty in Afghan Policy.”
These pressures tend to drive the policy agenda away from the needs of ordinary Afghans and toward externally designed policy models, shoring up local powerholders and cyclical short-term commitments. The effects of politics on Afghan development policy will not dissipate in the near term and may even become stronger. What is needed now is an increase in advocacy. Supported by evidence of the kind presented here, advocacy efforts must identify and push for the types of interventions most likely to make sustainable improvements to Afghan lives and drive home to policymakers that success in Afghanistan will not come without reducing poverty.
## Appendix 1: Improving Household Case Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household (Location)</th>
<th>Demographic</th>
<th>Land (jeribs - irrigated/rainfed)/Livestock</th>
<th>Other income</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Debt</th>
<th>Ceremonies</th>
<th>Factors driving change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muneer (Lalakai-10)</td>
<td>28 members; 5 working sons; 6 boys studying; conflict over education</td>
<td>150j and 15j garden</td>
<td>Brick kiln; livestock market; slaughter house; salary</td>
<td>1 illness; spent 74,000 Afs</td>
<td>Low to none</td>
<td>100,000 Afs for son’s marriage and bride price (BP)</td>
<td>Land; Diversification; sons’ labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqoob (Julan-40)</td>
<td>21 members; 6 sons working; 2 boys study</td>
<td>50j and garden; bought (or confiscated) land</td>
<td>Dubai car exports; salary; mechanic</td>
<td>2 people diabetic; 2 sons drug addicted</td>
<td>High, can repay quickly</td>
<td>450,000 Afs spent for marriage and BP</td>
<td>Land; Diversification; sons’ labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalakai-05</td>
<td>18 members; 2 sons work; boys studying</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Contracting business; own wood yard, truck and tractor</td>
<td>1 illness; spent 60,000 Afs on treatment</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 marriages; spent 200-300,000 Afs for weddings; against BP; sold unproductive land</td>
<td>Male labour; Connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamil (Julan-42)</td>
<td>16 members; 4 sons work; some boys at madrassa</td>
<td>18j land; sharecrop; 4j garden</td>
<td>3 sons in salary work (Karzai links)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 marriage; 200,000 Afs spent from savings</td>
<td>Land; Male labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julan-57</td>
<td>15 members; 2 sons work; 3 boys study</td>
<td>5j vineyard; Sold 3 j</td>
<td>Custom house; cook for weddings; mechanic; literacy course</td>
<td>1 illness; spent 45,000 Afs</td>
<td>70,000 Afs for marriage, health and house extension</td>
<td>2 marriages, 300,000 Afs; no BP; sold land and borrowed</td>
<td>Diversification; Connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (Cluster)</td>
<td>Household Size</td>
<td>Credit network</td>
<td>Ambition</td>
<td>Tools and Activities</td>
<td>Sources of Funds</td>
<td>Education and Employment</td>
<td>Future Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakin (Julan-56)</td>
<td>4 members; 0 sons working or studying (too young)</td>
<td>Sharecrop; livestock trading</td>
<td>Zaranj fares; history of labour work; embroidery</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Funds; investment</td>
<td>150,000 Afs for own marriage: savings and credit</td>
<td>Male labour of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najeeb (Shur Qul-24)</td>
<td>11 members; 2 sons working; 6 children study</td>
<td>1j ir., 5j RF; 110 trees; 1 cow</td>
<td>Lapis mine labour; driver with NGO; Iran, then ANSF</td>
<td>18,000 Afs for injured son; paid from salary</td>
<td>85,000 Afs; majority left from marriage; repay in 3 months. 10,000 Afs for Iran migration</td>
<td>250,000 Afs spent for wedding of eldest son. All borrowed</td>
<td>Salaried job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid (Shur Qul-34)</td>
<td>18 members; 2 in Pakistan; 4 sons working; children study</td>
<td>3j ir., 8j RF; 70 trees; Livestock; sharecrop</td>
<td>School teacher; NGO guard; NGO enterprise training</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Avoid debt</td>
<td>Sons responsible for marriage costs; 2 married sons</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shafiq (Lalakai-03)</td>
<td>9 members; 0 sons working; 2 boys study</td>
<td>Own house/land; 1 cow, diversifying into livestock</td>
<td>Used shoe sales; embroidery</td>
<td>Head disabled</td>
<td>100,000 Afs for land/house and rickshaw; repay but borrow to do so</td>
<td>Educate boys before marriage</td>
<td>Urban economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamid (Lalakai 19)</td>
<td>12 members; male head died 10-15 years ago. 5 sons working; children at madrassa</td>
<td>No land; 1 cow</td>
<td>Vending cloth and plasters; brickmaking; selling trouser string</td>
<td>1 illness; treated in Pakistan, 15,000 Afs; savings</td>
<td>About 100,000 Afs for working capital and marriage</td>
<td>290,000 Afs marriage and BP; salaries, credit</td>
<td>Urban economy, Male labour</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued on following page
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Sons Work</th>
<th>School Age</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Livestock Ownership</th>
<th>Livestock Source</th>
<th>Livestock Income</th>
<th>Illness</th>
<th>Illness Cost</th>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Land Source</th>
<th>Health Loss</th>
<th>Health Cost</th>
<th>Other Income</th>
<th>Other Income Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Haq</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>United joint family; male labour</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>High bride price</td>
<td>400,000 Afs</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>35,000 Afs</td>
<td>40,000 Afs</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalid</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Flour mill</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Brickmaking; sharecrop</td>
<td>Own land for house; sharecrop</td>
<td>Own land for house; sharecrop</td>
<td>Illness and death of male head</td>
<td>250,000 Afs</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Own truck/transport; shared truck driving; Guard in Kabul</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Own truck/transport; shared truck driving; Guard in Kabul</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>2 illnesses</td>
<td>100,000 Afs</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
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## Appendix 2: Coping Household Case Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Demographics</th>
<th>Land (jeribs - irrigated/rainfed)/Livestock</th>
<th>Other income</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Debt</th>
<th>Ceremonies</th>
<th>Factors influencing classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haji Wadi (Shur Qul-38)</td>
<td>13 members; 0 sons working; 7 children study (1 in medical school)</td>
<td>15 j ir., 5 j RF; 20 apple trees; 3 cows; sharecrop</td>
<td>Literacy course instructor; NGO salary</td>
<td>2 illnesses; borrowed, sold wood, land</td>
<td>73,000 Afs; negotiating land sale to repay</td>
<td>Accepted small bride price for daughter's marriage</td>
<td>Drought; Few earners, but head has salary; Lack of market access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fahim (Toghloq-77)</td>
<td>8 members; 1 son works; 1 son in Kabul with relative and studies; 4 children study</td>
<td>2 j ir; 1 cow; sold RF land</td>
<td>School caretaker salary; son in ANSF</td>
<td>Miscarriage 24000 Afs spent on transport and care</td>
<td>40,000 Afs</td>
<td>250,000 Afs for marriage; sold livestock and borrowed</td>
<td>Land and livestock sales but shifting to nonfarm livelihood; Few earners, but workers in salaried jobs; Health and ceremony spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khilar-56</td>
<td>11 members; 2 sons work; male head died; 2 study</td>
<td>4 j ir., 3 j RF; cow and goats/sheep; reduced herd size; bought land rights of relative</td>
<td>School teacher</td>
<td>3 illnesses/deaths; 23,500 Afs</td>
<td>52,000 Afs; funerals, land buy out, food; sell livestock to repay</td>
<td>3 deaths; 80,000 Afs on funerals; 8,500 charity</td>
<td>Drought; Few earners but one salary; Ill-health, funerals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalakai-01</td>
<td>16 members; 5 sons work; none study</td>
<td>sharecrop; live in landlord’s house</td>
<td>Drivers; market watchman; vending; trading; many failed investments</td>
<td>Limited treatment of elderly mother in law</td>
<td>400,000 Afs linked to investment losses, vehicle purchase etc.; credit harder to get</td>
<td>Exchange marriage; cannot afford BP</td>
<td>Investment losses and debt; Male labour, but poor quality, low paid work; Dependence on landlord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Heads</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalakai-12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>sharecrop; live in landlord’s house</td>
<td>Women work in landlord’s home; contract brickmaking; load carrying</td>
<td>Many with asthma; spend 100 Afs/week per person</td>
<td>40,000 Afs for marriage</td>
<td>Exchange marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julan-50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>head died; 5 sons work; 2 boys study</td>
<td>Land for house; 2 migrate to milk poppy; cow and few sheep; trade in goats tried; lack funds for feed</td>
<td>Daily labour; well drilling; bakery; lack capital to invest in workshop</td>
<td>100,000 Afs on head’s treatment; sale of goats, sons’ earnings used to pay</td>
<td>175,000 Afs; majority for land for house</td>
<td>60,000 Afs on funeral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Village Key

In the individual case studies that formed the basis paper, all study villages were referred to by alphabetical codes to ensure anonymity. These have now been changed to fictitious names for ease of reader reference.

Table A1: Fictitious names and original codes for study villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/District</th>
<th>Village name (fictitious)</th>
<th>Original code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kandahar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Lalakai</td>
<td>KA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dand</td>
<td>Julan</td>
<td>KB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Badakhshan</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamgan</td>
<td>Shur Qul</td>
<td>BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurm</td>
<td>Toghloq</td>
<td>BB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurm</td>
<td>Khilar</td>
<td>BC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sar-i-Pul</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyad</td>
<td>Kushlak</td>
<td>SA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyad</td>
<td>Pishin</td>
<td>SB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sayyad</td>
<td>Sarband</td>
<td>SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Faryab</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawlatabad</td>
<td>Chakar</td>
<td>FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawlatabad</td>
<td>Hisaar</td>
<td>FB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawlatabad</td>
<td>Efroz</td>
<td>FC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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